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Abstract
Existing programming language access control frameworks
do not meet the needs of all software components. We propose
an expressive framework for implementing access control
monitors for components. The basis of the framework is
a novel concept: the authority environment. An authority
environment associates rights with an execution context. The
building blocks of access control monitors in our framework
are authorization contracts: software contracts that manage
authority environments. We demonstrate the expressiveness
of our framework by implementing a diverse set of existing
access control mechanisms and writing custom access control
monitors for three realistic case studies.
1. Introduction
An access control monitor mediates requests to call sensitive
operations and allows each call if and only if the request
possesses the necessary rights to call the operation. Broadly
speaking, when an access control mechanism is presented
with a call to a sensitive operation, it must be able to answer
two questions. First, which rights are required for the call?
And second, which rights does the request possess? The
design of an access control mechanism specifies, implicitly
or explicitly, the answers to these questions.
For example, Unix file permissions describe which users
are allowed to call which operations on a file. The access
control mechanism uses file permissions to determine what
rights are necessary to call different sensitive operations. Each
Unix process executes on behalf of a specific user, and a
request to call an operation possesses the same rights as
the user of the process that issues the request. Thus, file
permissions answer the first question, and the rights of the
user associated with a process answer the second question.
Importantly, Unix associates users and processes in two
different ways. By default, a new process runs on behalf
of the same user as the process that spawned it. But a process
can run on behalf of a different user if it runs an executable
that has the setuid bit set. When a process invokes a setuid
executable, the operating system launches a new process
This technical report expands [30] with additional examples and code
listings, along with a formal definition and proof of complete monitoring for
the contract system described in Section 3.1.
to run the executable and associates the new process with
the user that owns the executable, rather than the user that
invoked it. Hence, this feature creates services that provide
restricted access to resources that an invoking user could not
otherwise access.
Similar to operating systems, software components also
need access control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized
clients from calling sensitive operations while allowing au-
thorized ones to do so. Thus, when responding to a request
to call a sensitive operation, access control mechanisms for
components must be able to answer the same two questions:
which rights are necessary for the call and which rights the
request possesses.
However, access control needs of components vary, and
it is impossible to choose a single answer to these questions
that satisfies all component authors. To make things worse,
access control mechanisms for general purpose programming
languages have made design choices that are not suitable for
all application domains and are typically mutually incom-
patible. For example, Java stack inspection [42] determines
the rights associated with a call site by walking the stack
from the current stack frame. In contrast, object-capability
languages (e.g., E [27] and Caja [28]) determine rights by the
lexical structure of the program: a code may call operations
on exactly those resources that are reachable from variables
in the code’s text.
In this paper we propose a new, extensible access control
framework that allows component authors to design access
control monitors that suit their needs. The framework sup-
ports the design and implementation of many different novel
and existing access control monitors for software compo-
nents. Moreover, because different monitors are implemented
using a common framework, different software components
within the same application can use different access control
mechanisms.
The framework builds on a novel concept: the authority
environment. Just as each execution context has a variable
environment that maps variable identifiers to values, each ex-
ecution context has an authority environment that associates
the context with its rights to call operations. The rights that a
call to a sensitive operation possesses are those possessed by
the authority environment of the call’s execution context.
By analogy with dynamic and lexical scoping of variable
environments, we identify two ways in which an execution
context can receive authority:
1. dynamically, by inheriting the authority environment of
the surrounding execution context, and
2. lexically, by capturing the authority environment of the
execution context where it is defined.
Returning to the Unix file system example, a process receives
authority dynamically when it inherits the user of the process
that launched it. A process receives authority “lexically”
when it runs a setuid executable.
Based on the correspondence with variable scoping, we
define a framework for designing access control monitors
as sets of monitor actions that manipulate authority environ-
ments (§3). We implement our framework as a library for
Racket [17] without changes to the language’s runtime. We
use higher-order contracts [16] to specify where an access
control monitor should interpose on a program and how it
should manage authority environments. Contracts are exe-
cutable specifications attached to software components that
support separation of concerns by removing defensive checks
from code implementing functionality [24–26]. In the same
way, our authorization contracts separate the task of access
control from the program’s functionality.
The design of this framework presents four major contri-
butions:
1. the introduction of authority environments as a unifying
concept for access control mechanisms (§2),
2. the introduction of context contracts to check and enforce
properties of execution contexts (§3.1),
3. a novel authorization logic for representing and querying
authority in authority environments (§3.2), and
4. authorization contracts that specialize context contracts
for managing authority environments and enforcing access
control policies expressed in the logic (§3.3).
We have used the framework to implement diverse access
control mechanisms: discretionary access control, stack in-
spection, history-based access control, and object-capabilities
(§4). We demonstrate the practicality of our approach with
three realistic case studies (§5).
2. Authority Environments
In this section, we introduce authority environments as a
unifying concept for access control. First, we review the
differences between lexical and dynamic scoping (§2.1). Then
we describe the connection between lexical and dynamic
scoping and access control (§2.2) and show how we can
use scoping in the design of a framework for writing access
control monitors (§2.3). Throughout, we use small examples
in the Racket programming language [17].
2.1 Lexical and Dynamic Scoping
The scope of a variable binding is the spatial and temporal
part of the program in which it is visible. A common way to
categorize strategies for assigning scopes to bindings is as
either lexical or dynamic. Earlier work distinguishes between
the scope of a binding, which describes where the binding
is visible in the program text, and the extent of a binding,
which describes when the binding is visible during execution.
Dynamic scope often refers to bindings that have dynamic
extent and “indefinite” scope. Here, we use dynamic scope to
refer to bindings that have dynamic extent and lexical scope,
also called “fluid” scope [18, 36, 37].
Under lexical scoping, a variable refers to the binding
from its closest binder in the textual structure of the program.
For example, in the Racket expression below, the variable
x in function f refers to the binding in the outer-most let
statement. The evaluation of this expression returns 0 since
the inner-most let statement has no effect on the value x
binds within f.
(let ([x 0])
(let ([f (lambda () x)])
(let ([x 42])
(f))))
In a programming language with fluid scoping, program-
mers can instead associate a binding with the dynamic extent
of an expression. That binding is visible to any code that runs
in the dynamic extent of the expression. For example, the
following Racket expression defines a new fluidly-scoped
variable x with default value 0. The parameterize expression
binds x to the value 42 in the dynamic extent of its body. The
variable x in the body of f refers to the most recent bind-
ing rather than the closest one in the program text. Since f
is invoked within the parameterize expression, the program
evaluates to 42 instead of 0.
(let ([x (make-parameter 0)])
(let ([f (lambda () (x))])
(parameterize ([x 42])
(f))))
Fluid scoping is a useful programming construct because
it allows the context of an expression to communicate with
its callees without explicitly threading arguments through the
program. For example, a library function for printing may
offer a parameter that determines the standard output file.
Instead of threading that file as an argument through every
function call leading to the printf routine, a client program
can instead set the parameter once and all calls to printf in
the body of the program see the client-specified file.
2.2 Scoping for Access Control
This ability to pass contextual information from an execution
context to an eventual callee closely matches the problem
of correctly determining the authority of a request to call a
sensitive operation. To demonstrate this relationship, consider
the design of a web application with multiple users. A
key component of this application is a login function that
authenticates users and executes code on their behalf:
(define (login user guess onSuccess)
(if (check-password? user guess)
(run-as-user user onSuccess)
(error "Wrong password!")))
This login function takes three arguments: the user attempt-
ing to authenticate, the password guess, and a callback
onSuccess to invoke with the user’s rights if the password
is correct. After checking the password, the login function
changes the state of the program to indicate that the current
user is now user and then calls onSuccess.
The body of onSuccess may attempt to access sensitive re-
sources. For example, it may try to update a user’s profile. To
avoid an unauthorized update, the update-profile function
checks whether the current user has sufficient rights:
(define (update-profile profileUser text)
(if (can-update? currentUser profileUser)
...
(error "Unauthorized!")))
Function can-update? compares the current user with the
user who owns the profile to determine whether the update
is authorized. This code thus implicitly uses the authority
of its context, i.e., the current user, in much the same way
that code accesses the dynamically scoped bindings from its
context. By managing authority as an implicit context in this
way, we can avoid modifying the code between the decision
to run a computation with particular authority and the call
to the sensitive operation. This has two advantages. First,
threading authority explicitly through the program reduces
extensibility, since third party code would need to be aware of
and correctly handle authority explicitly. Second, if the code
is untrustworthy, it might attempt to subvert the access control
checks that protect the sensitive operation by fabricating its
own authority.
Another requirement of the security of this application is
that only code running with the authority of the main loop is
allowed to switch users. According to the Principle of Least
Privilege [33], we should further limit the code that is allowed
to switch users to just the login function, and switch to an
unprivileged user for the rest the program. Crucially, the body
of the login function must still use the authority that was
in its environment when it was created, i.e., the authority of
the main loop. In a sense, for login, we wish to close over
the authority of the main loop, in the same way that closures
capture lexically scoped bindings.
To achieve this, we build on the analogy between scoping
and access control and introduce the concept of an authority
environment. An authority environment associates rights with
an execution context, just as a variable environment asso-
ciates bindings with an execution context. Just like variable
environments, authority environments can be captured and as-
sociated with code, updated, and extended with new bindings
for the dynamic extent of a computation. In this application,




















Figure 1. Defining a simple access control monitor
user on whose behalf the code executes. Section 2.3 shows
how authority environments help enforce access control in
our running example, including how to create a secure login
function. Section 3 generalizes authority environments so that
we can express a wide variety of access control mechanisms.
2.3 From Access Control to Authorization Contracts
Using the concept of an authority environment, we build an
access control monitor that manipulates and inspects the au-
thority environments of the example web application. The
monitor consists of actions that describe how events in the
execution of the application interact with its authority envi-
ronment. We describe our framework for defining monitors in
detail in Section 4. Here we explain only the features relevant
to the example.
Figure 1 shows our example monitor. The monitor speci-
fies three actions: setuid/c, chuser/c, and checkuser/c. Each
action defines a higher-order function contract [16]. When
one of these contracts is attached to a function, the contract
captures the current authority environment and associates
it with the function. When the function is called, the con-
tract has access to both the authority environment at the
call site and the authority environment that it has captured.
The monitor configures each action-contract with two hooks:
#:on-create and #:on-apply. By changing these hooks, mon-
itor designers can implement actions that implement different
forms of “lexically” and dynamically scoped authority envi-
ronments.
Action chuser/c is parameterized with an argument user
that identifies the user whose authority should be used dur-
ing the execution of the body of a contracted function. The
#:on-apply hook for chuser/c ignores the authority it has
closed over and sets the active principal to user for the dy-
namic extent of the body of the contracted function, but only
if the #:check holds, that is, the current-principal has au-
thority over user user. Otherwise, it raises a security violation
as a contract violation. Monitor action checkuser/c is also
parameterized with a user. Upon a call of its contracted func-
tion, it checks that the current-principal has authority over
user. If the check succeeds, the action does not change the
authority environment. If the check fails, the action raises a
security violation. The final monitor action, setuid/c, cre-
ates an authority closure: calling a function with this contract
changes the current principal in the authority environment to
the closed-over principal closure-principal for the dynamic
extent of the function’s body.
Using the monitor, we can now reimplement the web appli-
cation. First, we can replace code that defensively performs




(->a ([user principal?] [text string? ])
#:auth (user) (checkuser/c user)
any))
...)
This revised implementation of update-profile uses the
Racket form define/contract to attach a contract to the
update-profile function. This contract is a dependent con-
tract [16] for a function. It says that update-profile takes
two arguments: user, which must be a principal?, and text,
which must be a string?. The keyword argument1 #:auth
(user)(checkuser/c user) says that the authorization con-
tract for this function depends on the user argument and
attaches the contract (checkuser/c user) to the function. Fi-
nally, the range of this contract is any, making no require-
ments on the return values. The definition of the function can
now elide the authorization check.
We also revise the implementation of login:
(define/contract
(login user guess onSuccess)
(->a ([user principal?] [guess string?]
[onSuccess (user) (chuser/c user)])
#:auth () setuid/c any)
(if (check-password? user guess)
(onSuccess)
(error "Wrong password")))
The keyword argument #:auth () setuid/c attaches the
setuid/c action to the login function, capturing the authority
of the program context where it is created. This allows the
login function to execute with the captured authority and thus
allows the application to switch to a less privileged principal
without losing the ability to safely authenticate as a different
user. In the original implementation, login uses a hand-rolled
function run-as-user to confine onSuccess within the author-
1 In Racket, a keyword argument is a (possibly optional) argument passed by
keyword instead of position. A keyword is a symbol starting with #:.
ity of user. In the revised code, login can invoke onSuccess
directly. The contract on the onSuccess argument attaches the
action (chuser/c user) to the function. This ensures that any
call to onSuccess has the correct authority.
Rewriting this application to use authorization contracts
makes the authorization requirements of each function clear,
while also simplifying its implementation by removing au-
thorization code that was spread throughout the program.
3. A Framework for Access Control
In this section, we present the general design of our frame-
work with a formal model. First, we show how we extend
existing higher-order function contracts to context contracts
that check and modify information about their execution
context (§3.1). Context contracts are expressive enough to
enforce a wide range of properties. However, this flexibil-
ity makes it difficult to use them to implement and reason
about access control. To free users from this burden, our
framework provides a specialized interface for defining au-
thorization contracts. The interface simplifies the definition
of context contracts for access control in two ways. First, it
specifies a common representation for authorization environ-
ments (§3.2). At the core of this representation is a novel
authorization logic that describes how authority captured in
a closure may be used. Second, it defines combinators for
building authorization contracts (§3.3). Authorization con-
tracts are specializations of context contracts that use the
authorization logic to succinctly describe how they manage
authority environments.
3.1 A Contract System with Context Contracts
We model higher-order contracts and context contracts as
extensions to an applied lambda calculus with modules and
parameters, which implement dynamic binding. Figure 2 de-
scribes the syntax of our model. Figure 3 gives the reduction
semantics of the model. Evaluation contexts that are not pre-
sented in Figure 2 are standard and enforce call-by-value,
left-to-right evaluation. The type system and the definition of
evaluation contexts are given in Appendix A. Though we omit
the extension for clarity, we have also extended the model
with first class continuations, following Takikawa et al. [39],
because our implementation language supports them and they
interact in interesting ways with our framework.
The semantics of common language features is standard.
Below, we explain the semantics of modules, parameters,
higher-order contracts, and context contracts.
3.1.1 Modules
A program p is a sequence of modules followed by a top-level
expression. A module simultaneously defines a collection of
values owned by a single component and a set of contracts
for those values. Each module
module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . .
Surface syntax
p ::= m ; p | e
m ::= module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = e,. . .
e ::= v | e e | µx : τ. e | letx = e in e | e⊕ e
| e ≤ e | if e then e else e | make-parameter e
| parameterize e = e in e | ?e | e := e
| flat/c(e) | param/c(e) | e : τ → (e) e
| e : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e
| ctx/c(e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
v ::= () | n | #t | #f | λx : τ. e | c
c ::= flat/c(v) | param/c(c) | c : τ → (c) c
| c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) c
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )
τ ::= β | τ → τ | τ param | τ ctc | ctx ctc
β ::= Unit | Int | Bool
Expanded syntax
e ::= . . . | `monkj (e,e) | checkkj (e,e) | errorkj
| guardj (e,v,v,e) | install/pj (v,e,e)
v ::= . . . | p(r) | `param/pkj (c, v)
| `ctx/pkj (v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . .,v)
| install/pj (v,v,v)
Selected evaluation contexts
E ::= . . . | guardj (E,v,v,e)
| install/pj (v,e,E) | install/pj (v,E,v)
Figure 2. Syntax
has a label ` and defines a set of values y1, . . .. Values
within the module are visible only to subsequent modules
in the program if they are exported. An export declaration
xvi withxci binds xvi in the rest of the program to the value
defined as xvi in the where clause, but only after attaching
to it the contract defined as xci in the where clause. Meta-
function import, shown in Figure 3, substitutes occurrences
of xvi in the rest of the program with monitored values
`monkj (c,v) that enforce the contract.
3.1.2 Higher-order Contracts
Term `monkj (c,v) attaches contract c to value v and monitors
whether uses of v satisfy the contract. Labels j, k, and `,
identify, respectively, the module that imposed the contract,
the module that provided the value, and the module that is the
client of the value. The top-level expression of a program is
identified by the distinguished label `0. These labels are used
to assign blame when a contract is violated. The simplest
contract is a flat contract flat/c(vc) that takes a predicate vc as
an argument. Flat contracts can be applied only to values of
base types Int, Bool, and Unit. When the contract is attached
to a value, the predicate is applied to the value. If the predicate
returns true, the value passes to its context. Otherwise, the
contract system stops the program and raises an error blaming
the provider of the value.
Contract cd : τ → (cc) cr is a higher-order function con-
tract. It specifies a contract cd for the domain of the func-
tion and a contract cr for the range of the function. In addi-
tion, it specifies a context contract cc for the function. Con-
text contracts, novel to this work, are higher-order contracts
that enforce restrictions on the execution context of function
calls. They are described in detail below. Attaching contract
cd : τ → (cc) cr to a function returns a new value that en-
forces contracts on the argument and results of the function
and applies the context contract cc.
Contract cd : τ →a (λx : τ. ec) vr is an indy-dependent2
contract for higher-order functions. This contract corresponds
to the ->a contracts from Section 2. The contract is dependent
since the contract uses the argument of a contracted function
to choose a context contract for the function. Applying
a function v with this contract has four steps. First, the
argument is wrapped with the contract for the domain, cd.
Second, the wrapped argument is passed to the function
λx : τ. ec to construct a context contract. Third, the resulting
context contract is attached to v, which is applied to the
wrapped argument. Finally, the contract for the range, cr, is
attached to the result of the application.
3.1.3 Parameters
Parameters are first-class values that can be used to access
and install dynamic bindings. Parameters implement fluid
scope because access to their dynamic bindings is controlled
lexically by access to the parameter itself. The expression
make-parameter e creates a new parameter p(r) with de-
fault value the result of e, where r is a fresh tag uniquely
identifying the parameter. The default value is recorded in
the store σ. Term parameterize p(r) = e1 in e2 installs the
result of e1 as the new value of the parameter p(r) for the
dynamic extent of e2. Accessing the value of a parameter
with term ?p(r) returns the value of the closest enclosing
parameterize for p(r) in the current evaluation context. If
there is no such term, it returns the current value for r in the
store. Similarly, term p(r) := v mutates the current binding
for the parameter, updating the parameter associated with
either the closest enclosing parameterize for p(r) in the cur-
rent evaluation context or the value for r in the store, if there
is no such expression.
The parameter contract param/c(c) is a higher-order con-
tract that restricts uses of a parameter. A contracted parameter
v reduces to a proxy `param/pkj (c, v) that records the labels
of the contract, provider, and client modules and intercepts
uses of the parameter to enforce that values bound to the
parameter meet contract c.
2 An indy-dependent contract is a dependent function contract that uses the
“indy” strategy for blame assignment [9].
〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = e1,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉
→ 〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = {vi/yi}e1,ye2 = e2,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉
〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where . . . ,x1 = v1,. . . ,xc1 = c1,. . .; p, σ〉
→ 〈importJ`,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),pK, σ〉
〈E[(λx : τ. e) v], σ〉 → 〈E[{v/x}e], σ〉
〈E[µx : τ. e], σ〉 → 〈E[{µx:τ. e/x}e], σ〉
〈E[letx = v in e], σ〉 → 〈E[{v/x}e], σ〉
〈E[if #t then e1 else e2], σ〉 → 〈E[e1], σ〉
〈E[if #f then e1 else e2], σ〉 → 〈E[e2], σ〉
〈E[v1 ⊕ v2], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉 where v = v1 ⊕ v2
〈E[v1 ≤ v2], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉 where v = v1 ≤ v2
〈E[make-parameter v], σ〉 → 〈E[p(r)], σ[r 7→ v]〉 where r is fresh
〈E[?p(r)], σ〉 → 〈v, σ〉 where σ(r) = v and
E does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′
〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in E′[?r]], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in E′[v]], σ〉
where E′ does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′′
〈E[p(r) := v], σ〉 → 〈E[()], σ[r 7→ v]〉
where E does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′
〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in E′[p(r) := v′]], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′[v′]], σ〉
where E′ does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′′ in E′′
〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in v′], σ〉 → 〈E[v′], σ〉
〈E[`monkj (flat/c(vc),v)], σ〉 → 〈E[checkkj,k((vc v),v)], σ〉
〈E[`monkj (param/c(c),v)], σ〉 → 〈E[`param/pkj (c, v)], σ〉
〈E[`monkj (cd : τ → (cc) cr,v)], σ〉 → 〈E[(`monkj (cc,λ x : τd. `monkj (cr,vf kmon`j(cd,x))) v)], σ〉
where x is fresh
〈E[`monkj (cd : τ →a (λx : τ. ec) cr,v)], σ〉 → 〈E[λ y : τd. `monkj ({
kmon`j(cd,y)/x}ec,`monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,y)))], σ〉
where y is fresh
〈E[`monkj (ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . ,va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . ),v)], σ〉 → 〈E[checkkj ((vc ()),e)], σ〉
where e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v)))
〈E[(`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,vf ) v)], σ〉
→ 〈E[(check`j((va ()),e) v)], σ〉
where e = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf ))
〈E[guardj (#f,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 → 〈E[ef ], σ〉
〈E[guardj (#t,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 → 〈E[install/pj (vp,(vv ()),ef )], σ〉
〈E[(install/pj (vp,vv,vf ) v)], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize vp = vv in (vf v)], σ〉
〈E[?`param/pkj (c, vp)], σ〉 → 〈E[`monkj (c,?vp)], σ〉
〈E[parameterize `param/pkj (c, vp) = v in e], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize vp = kmon`j(c,v) in e], σ〉
〈E[`param/pkj (c, vp) := v], σ〉 → 〈E[vp := kmon`j(c,v)], σ〉
〈E[checkkj (#t,v)], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉
〈E[checkkj (#f,v)], σ〉 → 〈errorkj , σ〉
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),m1; . . . ;mn;eK =
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),m1K;
. . . ;
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),mnK;
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),eK
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = enK =
module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = {
`monkk(ci,vi)/xi}e1,. . . ,yn = {
`monkk(ci,vi)/xi}en
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),eK = {`0monkk(ci,vi)/xi}e
Figure 3. Reduction semantics
3.1.4 Context Contracts
To track properties of execution contexts, context contracts
use parameters to install and access relevant state. A context
contract interposes on programs at two key times: when the
contract is attached to a function and when the contracted
function is applied. At both times, the contract can inspect
the current values of parameters to check that the current
environment is satisfactory, capture the current value for later
use, or change the parameterization of a call to the contracted
function.
A context contract
ctx/c(vc,(vgc ⇒ vpc ← vvc), . . . ,
va,(vga ⇒ vpa ← vva), . . . )
has four parts:
1. vc, a predicate that checks whether the context is appro-
priate when the contract is attached,
2. (vgc ⇒ vpc ← vvc), . . ., a list of guarded parameteriza-
tions, described below, to close over when the contract is
attached,
3. va, a predicate that checks whether the context is appro-
priate when the contract function is called, and
4. (vga ⇒ vpa ← vva), . . ., a list of guarded parameteriza-
tions to be installed around the body of the contracted
function if the contract check succeeds.
The first two parts are evaluated when the contract is attached
to a value. First, the predicate vc is executed to allow the con-
tract to check the current context. If the predicate returns #f, a
contract error is raised blaming the client of the contract. Oth-
erwise, each guarded parameterization (vgc ⇒ vpc ← vvc)
from part 2 is evaluated in turn. Each guarded parameteriza-
tion specifies a guard function vgc , a parameter vpc , and a
value function vvc . If invoking the guard thunk vgc returns
#t, the corresponding value thunk vvc is executed to produce
a new value. This value is “closed over” and re-installed
for parameter vpc when the contracted function is applied.
The predicate va and the remaining parameterizations are
recorded in a proxy `ctx/pkj (va,(vga ⇒ vpa ← vva), . . .,v).
The proxy enforces additional checks and parameteriza-
tions when the contracted function is called. First, the pa-
rameter values captured when the contract was attached are
reinstalled. This gives the evaluation of the proxy and the
function call access to some bindings from when the contract
was attached, in addition to any bindings that are present in
the current evaluation context. With these captured bindings
in place, the proxy first evaluates the predicate va, which
checks whether the current context is satisfactory. If the pred-
icate returns false, a contract error is raised blaming the client
`. Otherwise, the guarded parameterizations of the proxy
are evaluated in a similar fashion as before. However, any
new bindings are installed just for the dynamic extent of the
contracted function’s call.
Figure 4 demonstrates context contracts with a small exam-
ple. The example involves two context contracts, outer/ctx
module ` exports innerwith inner/c,
outerwith outer/c
where inner = λx : Int. x,
outer = λ f : (Int→ Int). λ x : Int. (f x),
true = λ _ : Unit. #t,
int/c = flat/c(λ _ : Int. #t),
fun/c = λ ctx : ctx ctc. (int/c : Int→ (ctx) int/c),
any/ctx = ctx/c(true,true),
any/c = (fun/c any/ctx),
p = make-parameter #f,
check/ctx = ctx/c(true,λ _ : Unit. ?p),
enable/ctx = ctx/c(true,true,((true⇒ p← true))),
enable/c = (fun/c enable/ctx),
inner/c = (fun/c check/ctx),
outer/c = (any/c : (Int→Int)→ (any/ctx) enable/c);
(inner 42)
Figure 4. Context contracts enforcing nested applications.
module ` exports . . .
where . . . ,
cp = make-parameter #f,
capture/ctx = ctx/c(true,
((true⇒ cp← λ _ : Unit. ?p)),
true,
((true⇒ p← λ _ : Unit. ?cp)))
. . . ;
. . .
Figure 5. A context contract that closes over parameter p.
and inner/ctx, that communicate via parameter p. The con-
tracts ensure that function inner can be applied only in the
dynamic extent of the function returned by outer. Evaluating
(inner 42) results in a contract error errortop` blaming the
context that applied inner. Replacing this expression with
((outer inner) 42) evaluates to 42.
The ability to close over an environment is a key feature
of authorization contracts. To see that context contracts can
close over some part of the environment when a contract is
applied, consider extending the example in Figure 4 with
the contract capture/c from Figure 5. This contract captures
the value of parameter p when the contract is applied, and
reinstates that value for the dynamic extent of subsequent
applications of the contracted value.
3.1.5 Complete Monitoring
Our contract system satisfies complete monitoring [9], an
important correctness criterion for contract systems. Com-
plete monitoring guarantees that a contract system correctly
assigns blame to components that violate their contracts and,
crucially, that the contract system can interpose on all uses
of a value in a component that did not create that value. This
property makes contracts suitable for interposing on pro-
grams to enforce access control policies. Moreover, because
the interposition is local to individual components, an access
control monitor can be installed around a component without
a global enforcement mechanism or the cooperation of other
components.
Put differently, complete monitoring guarantees that con-
tracts can enforce the same set of properties as reference
monitors: an arbitrary prefix-closed property of a sequence
of events. For contracts, these events are the attachment of
contracts to values and the use of contracted values. In con-
trast, for inlined reference monitors built with aspects, this
set of events is determined by the point-cuts selected by the
policy. In either case, the programmer must correctly identify
relevant events and specify the policy, but can assume the
policy is enforced.
The formal definition and proof of complete monitoring
for our contract system are given in Appendix B.
3.2 Representing Authority
In principle, a programmer can use context contracts to
enforce arbitrary properties of execution contexts such as
access control, but in practice this requires the careful design
of an appropriate representation of the relevant information
as an environment, i.e., a set of parameters. In particular, for
access control this requires a representation of the authority
of an execution context.
The authority of an execution context describes the rights
it has to perform sensitive operations. In different access
control mechanisms, the form and organization of these rights
varies. For example, in a web application, a session executes
on behalf of a particular user whose rights may change over
time in accordance with the access control policies attached
to the application’s resources. In the Java stack inspection
framework, rights are sets of “permissions” possessed by
activation records that can be queried with the checkPermission
operation.
A common way to describe the structure of authority in
an access control system involves a mapping from subjects
(users, processes, or security domains) to access rights for
objects (resources that require the protection of the access
control system) [22]. In practice, subjects and objects may
comprise the same entities, so we refer to both as security
principals (or, simply, principals).
To build a framework that supports many different access
control mechanisms, we need a general way to express
and reason about principals, the authority of principals, and
how principals delegate and restrict their authority. For this
purpose, we use an authorization logic [2] based on the
Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM) [5]. We briefly
describe our logic, highlighting where it differs from FLAM.
In Section 3.3, we employ this logic to represent authority as
a set of parameters that are managed by specialized context
contracts, dubbed authorization contracts.
Figure 6 presents the syntax of our logic. We assume an
enumerable set of primitive principals P . Primitive principals
represent program entities that possess rights, such as users,
modules, or activation records. We assume a most trusted
principal > and a least trusted principal ⊥. For principals p
and q, the conjunctive principal p ∧ q is a principal with the
Primitives P ::= a | b | . . .
Projection dimensions d ::= α | β | . . .
Principals p, q, r, s ::= P | > | ⊥
| p ∧ p | p ∨ p
| p . d | ←D p | →D p
Delegations A ::= p  p @ p
Delegation sets D ::= {A,A, . . .}
Figure 6. Syntax of principals, delegations, and worlds
authority of both p and q. Similarly, the disjunctive principal
p ∨ q has the authority of either p or q.
If principal p trusts principal q, we write q  p, and
say that q acts for p. The acts-for relation is reflexive and
transitive, and induces a lattice structure over the set of
principals, with conjunction as join, disjunction as meet, and
> and ⊥ as the top and bottom elements of the lattice.
Principals may assert the existence of trust relationships.
A delegation p  q @ r means that principal r asserts that
p acts for q (or, equivalently, that q delegates its authority to
p). Of course, whether a principal s believes the assertion
depends on whether s trusts principal r. (We differ from
FLAM in that we describe only the integrity of delegations,
not their confidentiality.)
Judgment D ; r ` p q denotes that given the set of
delegations D, principal r believes that principal p acts for
principal q. Intuitively, r believes that p acts for q if that trust
relationship can be derived using only delegations asserted
by principals that r trusts.
Figure 7 presents the inference rules for the judgment
D ; r ` p q. Rules BOT, TOP, REFL, TRANS, CONJ-LEFT,
CONJ-RIGHT, DISJ-LEFT, and DISJ-RIGHT are standard and
provide the underlying lattice structure for the acts-for rela-
tion. Rule DEL captures the intuition that principal r trusts
only delegations asserted by principals that it trusts, that is
delegations p  q @ s where D ; r ` s r
We have three additional principal constructors. Princi-
pal p . α is the projection of the authority of principal p on
dimension α3. We use projections to limit or attenuate the
authority of a principal, and to identify access rights. For ex-
ample, p.filesmay refer to principal p’s authority restricted
to p’s rights to access the file system. Similarly, principal
p . obj . invoke (equivalently p . invoke . obj) might refer
to the right to invoke a particular object belonging to principal
p. Principal p can grant this right to another principal q by
asserting a delegation: q  p . obj . invoke @ p.
We leave projection dimensions underspecified, and access
control mechanisms can define their own dimensions. For any
projection dimension α, principal p acts for principal p . α,
as captured in Rule PROJ. Typically the converse does not
hold, and so p . α has strictly less authority than p.
Novel to this work, we introduce closure principals ←D p
and →D p. Given a set of delegations D and principal p,
3 FLAM considers basis projections and ownership projections. The projec-
tions we use here are more general and have less structure than either. In
addition to preserving the acts-for lattice, the only structure we impose is
that projections are commutative: p . α . β = p . β . α.
BOT
D ; r ` p ⊥
TOP
D ; r ` > p
PROJ
D ; r ` p p . α
CONJ-LEFT
D ; r ` pk  q k ∈ {1, 2}
D ; r ` p1 ∧ p2 q
CONJ-RIGHT
D ; r ` p q1 D ; r ` p q2
D ; r ` p q1 ∧ q2
DISJ-LEFT
D ; r ` p1 q D ; r ` p2 q
D ; r ` p1 ∨ p2 q
DISJ-RIGHT
D ; r ` p qk k ∈ {1, 2}
D ; r ` p q1 ∨ q2
DEL
p  q @ s ∈ D D ; r ` s r
D ; r ` p q
CLOSURE-LEFT
D′ ; s ` p q D ; r ` ←D′s r
D ; r ` p ←D′q
CLOSURE-RIGHT
D′ ; s ` p q D ; r ` ←D′s r
D ; r ` →D′p q
REFL
D ; r ` p p
TRANS
D ; r ` p q D ; r ` q s
D ; r ` p s
Figure 7. Inference rules for judgment D ; l ` p q
the left-closure principal ←D p represents p with all of the
trust relationships derivable from D where p delegates its
authority to other principals. The right-closure principal
→
D p represents p with all of the trust relationships derivable
from D where p acts for other principals. In our framework,
delegations may change over time. Closure principals are
useful because they allow us to capture trust relationships
as they exist at particular moments in time. In particular,
closure principals are a principled mechanism to describe
how authority captured by a context contract should be
combined with the current authority environment based on
which parts of the closed over authority environment are
trusted by principals in the current authority environment.
Rule CLOSURE-LEFT shows that D ; r ` p ←D′q holds
when there is some principal s such that at the time of
closure creation (i.e., with delegation set D′), s believed that
p acted for q (premise D′ ; s ` p q), and moreover, right
now (i.e., with delegation set D) principal r trusts principal
←
D′s (premise D ; r ` ←D′s r). Typically, s and r are the
same principal, meaning that r-at-time-D trusts the decisions
made by r-at-time-D′. Rule CLOSURE-RIGHT is similar and
D ; r ` →D′p q holds when there is some principal s such
that at the time the closure was taken s believed that p acted
for q (premise D′ ; s ` p q), and principal r trusts s-at-
time-D′ (premise D ; r ` ←D′s r).
To query whether a particular set of delegations satisfies
an acts-for relation, we use a proof search algorithm adapted
from FLAM [5]. We give examples of using delegations to
implement different authorization mechanisms in Section 4.
Based on this logic, we represent an authority environment
as:
1. a principal, who is responsible for the current execution
context, and
2. a delegation set, which records the current trust relation-
ships between principals.
The latter has two sub-parts: a global, mutable delegation set,
and a set of delegations that are in place only for a currently
executing context.
3.3 Authorization Contracts
Using authority environments, we can now introduce autho-
rization contracts. Authorization contracts specialize context
contracts in two ways. First, they prevent interference from
untrustworthy code by using parameters that the rest of the
program does not have access to. Second, they use a high-
level representation of authority environments rather than
directly manipulating parameters. Authorization contracts
provide a structured way to describe how the underlying
context contracts should manipulate authority environments.
Authorization contracts are defined as monitor actions
using the define-monitor form (§2). In this section, we model
a pared-down version of define-monitor as an extension to
the language model from Section 3.1. Figure 8 displays the
syntax of the extension. The extension introduces new types,
constructors, and operations for principals, delegations, and
delegations sets, including an expression that evaluates an
acts-for judgment: e ; e ` e e. The define-monitor form
corresponds to the monitor (a . . .) form that can appear in the
where clause of a module definition in the extended model.
Each a in monitor (a . . .) is an action specification. An action
specification actionx (y : τ, . . .) (ce,ae) has a name (x), a
set of arguments (y : τ, . . .), and two terms (ce and ae) that
define the action’s #:on-create and #:on-apply hooks.
The term for the #:on-create hook has the form
check: cee add: cee remove: cee set!-principal: cee
closure-principal: cee closure-delegations: cee
and specifies what the authorization contract should do when
the contract is applied to a value. In particular it describes
how to modify each part of the authority environment. Its
field check accepts an acts-for judgment. If this judgement
does not hold, a contract error is raised blaming the client of
the contract. Field add accepts a set of delegations to add to
the global delegation set. Field remove accepts a set of dele-
gations to remove from the global delegation set, if present.
Field set!-principal changes the current principal to the given
principal. Fields closure-principal and closure-delegations
accept a principal and a set of delegations, respectively, and
record the principal and delegations for use upon a call to
the contracted function. Terms in each of these six fields can
access the pieces of the current authority environment using
current-principal and current-delegations.
m ::= module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = e,. . . ,monitor (a, . . .),x = e,. . .
v ::= . . . | > | ⊥ | P | D | v  v @ v | {v, . . .}
e ::= . . . | new-principal | new-dimension | e . e | e ; e ` e e | e  e @ e | letx  x @ x = e in e
| {} | {e} | e ∪ e | e \ e | (fold e e e)
β ::= . . . | Prin | Dim | Del | DelSet
a ::= actionx (y : τ, . . .) (ce,ae)
ce ::= check: cee add: cee remove: cee set!-principal: cee closure-principal: cee closure-delegations: cee
ae ::= check: aee add: aee remove: aee scope: aee set-principal?: aee principal: aee set!-principal: aee
cee ::= e | letx = cee in cee | current-principal | current-delegations
aee ::= e | letx = aee in aee | current-principal | current-delegations | closure-principal | closure-delegations
Figure 8. Syntax extensions for authorization contracts.
The second term corresponds to the #:on-apply hook,
which specifies what the authorization contract should do
upon a call of the contracted function. It has the form
check: cee add: cee remove: cee scope: cee
set-principal?: cee principal: cee set!-principal: cee.
Similar to a ce term, it allows the configuration of the
contract’s behavior. As before, check accepts an acts-for
judgment and raises a contract error if it does not hold.
Likewise, fields add and remove mutate the global delegation
set, and field set!-principal changes the current principal. The
scope field accepts a set of delegations, but this set is installed
only for the dynamic extent of the current function call, rather
than added to the global delegation set. The set-principal?
field requires a boolean value. If that value is #t, the current
authorization environment is extended with a principal for
the dynamic extent of the function call. This (1) allows
changing the principal visible within the extent of the function
call and (2) prevents contracts that change the principal
during the extent of the function call from modifying the
principal of the enclosing context. In addition to accessing
the current principal and delegations from the authority
environment, the seven fields of an ae term can access the
principal and delegations closed over by the contract with
terms closure-principal and closure-delegations.
To give a detailed semantics for monitor terms, we use a
compilation function that replaces monitor expressions with
terms that explicitly construct context contracts. The compi-
lation uses five parameters: one each for the current principal,
global delegation set, and scoped delegation set, plus a pair
to record the closed-over principal and delegations. Each
monitor term generates a fresh set of parameters, preventing
separately defined monitors from interfering with each other.
Each action term compiles to a single context contract that
closes over the fresh parameters. The full compilation func-
tion is listed in Appendix A, along with typing judgments for
authorization contracts and the semantics of expressions that
operate on principals, dimensions, delegations, and delega-
tion sets.
The hooks for defining actions are sufficiently flexible
to implement a variety of access control mechanisms (§4).
Here, we briefly describe some of the ways programmers can
configure authorization contracts.
Mutable Authority Many access control mechanisms have
a global policy that changes over time. For example, in
discretionary access control, users can grant or revoke access
to their resources. We can implement this with a contract that
adds or removes (global) delegations.
Dynamically-scoped Authority An authority closure can
inherit the authority environment from its calling context by
ignoring the authority environment it closes over.
“Lexically”-scoped Authority An authority closure can
isolate itself from the authority of its calling context by
replacing the authority environment at a call site with the
authority that it closes over.
Moreover, different access control mechanisms may re-
quire authorization contracts that blend these different strate-
gies. For example, implementing setuid-like authority clo-
sures requires capturing the principal but not the delegations
the closures close over. Otherwise, updates to the global, mu-
table discretionary access control policy would be forgotten
when a setuid function runs.
4. Putting Authorization Contracts to Work
As evidence of the usefulness and expressiveness of the
framework, we implemented a variety of existing access
control mechanisms including discretionary access control,
stack inspection [42], history-based access control [1], and
object capabilities [27]. Before delving into the mechanisms,
we further explain define-monitor, the main linguistic tool
that our framework provides.
4.1 The define-monitor Form
Figure 9 shows the complete syntax of define-monitor. It has
two sections in addition to the action section we have seen
before: extra and syntax. The first defines extra functions
and contracts that the programmer wants to include in the in-
terface of a monitor. These are usually contracts that combine
two or more actions together or contracts that fix the argu-
ments of an action. The syntax section defines macros that
(define-monitor monitor-name
(monitor-interface
action-name ... extra-name ...)
(monitor-syntax-interface
syntax-name ...)





(extra ; additional monitor abstractions
(define extra-name extra-body)
... )
(syntax ; syntactic monitor abstractions
(define-syntax syntax-name syntax-body)
... ))
Figure 9. The define-monitor form
serve as syntactic abstractions over the monitor’s interface,
for example, to automate the placement of authority contracts
when defining a function. We give examples of definitions in
the extra and syntax sections later. The monitor-interface
and monitor-syntax-interface clauses specify which ele-
ments are available to users of the monitor. After defining a
monitor monitor-name, a client can instantiate it with (run
monitor-name). This creates a fresh monitor, i.e., one with a
fresh authority environment and contracts.
The most complicated part of defining a monitor is writing
the two hooks for each monitor action. To facilitate this, we
provide two functions, do-create and do-apply, that simplify
this process. Each function has optional keyword arguments
corresponding to the fields of an action form in Section 3.3.
The functions provide default values for any argument not
specified. Thus, the programmer need only specify the results
of the hooks they care about. For instance, the default value
for the argument with keyword #:check seen in Figure 1 is
an acts-for relation that is always true.
4.2 A Discretionary Access Control Monitor
In a discretionary access control system, individual users
can choose what policy to enforce on objects they control.
We extended the basic discretionary access control monitor
from Figure 1 with additional contracts for marking functions
as objects owned by individual users, and for granting or
revoking the right to invoke these functions. The resulting
monitor is shown in Figure 11 in Appendix C. It defines four
actions: make-user/c, make-object/c, grant/c, and revoke/c.
Action make-user/c creates an authority closure that cap-
tures a fresh principal representing a new user. Invoking the
wrapped function requires that the current principal at the
call site is authorized for the invoke projection of the new
user’s authority, and switches to the new user’s principal
without modifying any delegations. Action make-object/c
creates a new projection of the current user’s authority, and
requires that any context invoking the wrapped function has
authority to use this projection of the user’s authority. Action
grant/c takes two functions as arguments, one wrapped with
a make-user/c authorization contract and one wrapped with a
make-object/c contract. When a function wrapped with this
contract is applied, the contract adds a new delegation that
says the principal of the make-user/c closure acts for the prin-
cipal of the make-object/c closure. This delegation is ignored
if the current context has insufficient authority to delegate
the object. Similarly, revoke/c takes a user and an object as
arguments, and removes any delegation from the global del-
egation environment that grants the user right to invoke the
object where the current principal acts for the principal that
asserted the delegation.
4.3 A Stack Inspection Monitor
In stack inspection [42], code obtains permissions based on
static properties such as the package it belongs to. At run
time, code can choose to enable its static permissions making
them eligible for satisfying an access control check. Before a
sensitive operation, stack inspection checks for the presence
of a particular permission by walking the run-time call stack
until a frame from code that has enabled the permission
is found. To prevent luring attacks [42], stack inspection
additionally requires that all execution contexts between the
enabled permission and the authorization check have the
required static permission. Despite this protection, untrusted
code may be able to influence the program even if its frames
are no longer on the stack. As a result, modern adaptations of
stack inspection provide additional support for capturing the
permissions of the stack at some point in an execution and
reinstating them for a later check.
Implementations of stack inspection provide the follow-
ing primitives: checkPermission, which checks that a frame
on the stack has the required permission enabled and that
all intervening frames have the required static permission;
doPrivileged, which enables the static permissions of the cur-
rent code for its dynamic extent, possibly using captured per-
missions instead of the current permissions; and getContext,
which captures the permissions of the stack at some point in
execution. In addition, the implementation must provide a
mechanism to associate static permissions with code.
To realize stack inspection using authorization contracts,
a monitor must provide (1) actions that implement these
primitives and (2) a way to grant static permissions to code.
In our monitor, the actions for (1) are check-permission/c,
do-privileged/c, and context/c. To track which permissions
are held by code on the stack, we use the authority environ-
ment to grant permissions to individual frames, each repre-
sented by a distinct principal. Each stack frame has three
projections that are used to manage its authority. The static
projection indicates the permissions granted to the code stati-
cally. The enable projection has the authority of the permis-
sions enabled for this frame. The active projection represents
permissions that would satisfy a privilege check. We say a
principal has a particular permission if it acts for the corre-
sponding projection of the > principal.
We use one additional monitor action, privileged/c, to in-
dicate the static permissions a piece of code possesses and to
enforce that a stack frame’s active projection acts for exactly
those permissions for which checkPermission should suc-
ceed. Action privileged/c takes a list of permissions (each
of which is a projection of the> principal). On an #:on-apply
event, it creates a new principal callee to represent the new
stack frame and adds delegations initializing these projections
for the dynamic extent of the function:
( @ (. callee static) permissions >)
( @ (. callee enable)
(. current-principal active)
current-principal)
( @ (. callee active)
(∨ (. callee enable) (. callee static))
callee).
These delegations give callee the specified static permissions
(by asserting that the callee’s static dimension acts for
the conjunctive principle permissions), assert that the new
frame inherits the active permissions from the previous
frame, and require that the callee has both static and enabled
permissions to make them active.
Tracking the authority of each frame in this way makes
walking the stack unnecessary. Action check-permission/c
only checks that the active projection of the current principal
acts for all of the requested permissions.
Action do-privileged/c enables the current frame’s static
permissions by adding a delegation from the frame’s static
projection to its enable projection for the dynamic extent of
the wrapped function.
Action context/c is used to capture the permissions of
the current stack for future permission checks. It captures
the current authorization environment when it is attached
to a function. When it is invoked, it installs the same set of
delegations as privileged/c, except that the first delegation
that grants static permissions gets replaced with a delegation
that derives permissions from the active permissions of the
captured frame at the time they were captured:




The right-closure principal on the right hand side of this del-
egation acts for all of the principals that closure-principal
acted for when the closure was created.
The monitor must also provide (2) a way to grant static per-
missions to code. Because Racket does not have class-loading
facilities that would allow permissions to be granted to code
at load-time, we use macros to attach authorization contracts
to code that should have static permissions. In particular,
the monitor provides a new definition form define/rights
in its syntax section. This form works like the define form,











; read-file: contract violation;
; (. frame10247 active) 6 (. > filesys)
; @ (. > filesys)
; contract from: (definition read-file)
; blaming: top-level
Figure 10. Using the stack inspection monitor
but takes two additional arguments: a set of permissions and
a contract to apply to the definition. It defines a function
wrapped with the given contract and a privileged/c contract.
In addition, the macro define/rights coerces any function
arguments or free-variables appearing in the body of the func-
tion to authority closures by applying an additional contract
unprivileged/c, which is defined in the extra section of the
monitor. Action unprivileged/c switches to the ⊥ princi-
pal for the dynamic extent of the closure it wraps, prevent-
ing any check-permission/c actions from succeeding. Thus,
these contracts prevent functions that were not defined with
define/rights from using code that requires permissions.
The complete implementation of the monitor is given in
Figure 12 in Appendix C, and Figure 10 shows an exam-
ple program using the stack inspection monitor. There are
three functions defined using define/rights. Two of these
functions are trusted to access the filesystem: read-file and
read-privileged. However, read-file should not be used
directly, so it checks that the filesys permission has been en-
abled by one of its callers. Function read-privileged enables
the filesys permission, but only calls read-file if the file
is safe to read. Function malicious does not have the filesys
permission but attempts to read "/etc/passwd" anyway, so
invoking this function results in a contract violation. The
contract violation says that the stack frame corresponding to
the call to read-file does not have the necessary permission
filesys.
4.4 A History-Based Access Control Monitor
Abadi and Fournet [1] observe that stack inspection fails to
protect against attacks where the influence of untrusted code
is no longer apparent from the call stack. As a remedy, they
propose history-based access control (HBAC). In HBAC,
the rights of an execution context depend not just on the
rights of code currently on the execution stack, but also
on the rights of all code that has previously been executed.
HBAC has two primitives: grant and accept. grant has the
same behavior as the do-privileged operator we implement
for stack inspection. accept allows a component to take
responsibility for code in its dynamic extent. After accept
returns, it restores any privileges that were present before it
was invoked.
Our implementation of a monitor for HBAC is very similar
to the monitor for stack inspection, and is shown in Figure 13
in Appendix C. The primary difference between the two
monitors is the definition of action privileged/c. In the
HBAC monitor, in addition to initializing the three projections
for the new frame, its #:on-apply event walks the call stack
by reading the current delegations. For every frame on the call
stack, it adds a disjunct with the callee’s static permissions
to the delegation that granted permissions from that frame’s
caller. For example, the delegation:
( @ (. parent enable) (. grandparent
active)
grandparent)
is replaced with the delegation:
( @ (. parent enable)
(∨ (. grandparent active) (. callee
static))
grandparent)
This means that future attempts to use the parent frame’s
permissions will be restricted to whatever rights the callee
had, unless the parent frame specifically vouches for an
action by enabling its own permissions.
We define accept/c in the extra section. accept/c uses
the accept-context/c action to create an authority closure
around its continuation. When the function accept/c wraps
returns, accept/c invokes this continuation, restoring the
authority environment before the wrapped function was
called.
4.5 An Object Capability Monitor
Authority closures are closely related to the idea of capabili-
ties. A capability both designates a resource and confers the
authority necessary to use it [8]. An authority closure des-
ignates resources (those accessed by the wrapped function)
and captures the authority that should be used to access those
resources. Any code that can invoke an authority closure can
exercise the authority of the closure, though that authority is
attenuated by the functionality of the closure itself. For ex-
ample, in our web application example, login is a capability
that allows any code that invokes it to use the “root” user’s
authority; however, the implementation of the login function
ensures that this authority can be used only to switch to a
different user after supplying the correct password.
In a memory-safe programming language, any reference
to a value can be considered a capability that grants restricted
access to some set of resources that can be accessed through
it (by invoking or otherwise inspecting it). Object-capability
languages like E [27], Joe-E [23], or Caja [28], embrace this
fact as the basis of their security architecture. In an object-
capability language, all sensitive resources are represented as
objects. Access to these objects is controlled by structuring
the language to limit the ways that objects acquire references
to other objects [27]:
1. by initial conditions: two objects may reference each other
before a computation begins,
2. by parenthood: the creator of an object is initially the only
object with a reference to it,
3. by endowment: an object can close over references to
objects available in its parent’s environment, and
4. by introduction: an object can receive a references to other
objects passed as arguments to its methods or returned
from methods it invokes.
These restrictions are sometimes referred to as “capabil-
ity safety” and are designed to support modular reasoning
about security. For example, the restrictions above are suffi-
cient to enforce the property that “only connectivity begets
connectivity;” that is, two components may communicate or
share references only via a capability shared by both compo-
nents [27].
We built a monitor to enforce capability safety. This moni-
tor, shown in Figure 14 in Appendix C, defines two actions,
capability/c and unprivileged-capability/c, which is the
same as the capability/c, but does not grant any initial au-
thority. These actions enforce capability safety by creating
a new principal for each capability and using delegations
to specify when one capability has the authority to invoke
another. Their #:on-create hooks handle parenthood and en-
dowment and their #:on-apply hooks handle introduction.
Parenthood amounts to a delegation:
( @ (. parent caps) (. child invoke) child)
Similarly, endowment closes over the current authority of the
parent and grants it to the child:
( @ (. child caps)
(→ (. parent caps)
current-delegations)
parent)
We must also assert that the parent authorizes the use of its
closed-over delegations for the rest of the execution:
( @ (← parent current-delegations) parent
parent)
Introduction is implemented by adding additional delegations
granting callees authority over arguments they are passed,
and vice versa for return values.
5. Case Studies
To evaluate the use of our framework in practical applica-
tions, we developed three case studies. The first adds simple
authorization contracts to the implementation of a card game
to ensure that player’s moves affect only the parts of the game
state they control. The second secures a plugin interface of
the DrRacket development environment and demonstrates
how the flexibility of the framework can support complex
security mechanisms. The third, which mirrors the example
from Section 2.2, replaces authorization checks in a web
application with authorization contracts.
We evaluated the performance of our framework on each
case study. The experiments were conducted on a MacBook
Pro with a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16GB of RAM running
Mac OS X 10.11 and Racket 6.4.0.9. In the first two case
studies, authorization contracts have significant impact on
the performance of the benchmarks. However, both case
studies are worst case scenarios: they have no existing code
implementing access control (and so we are strictly adding
functionality), and after adding contracts, they invoke many
access control checks (tens of thousands in the case of the
card game) while performing cheap operations. Moreover,
in the DrRacket case study, the absolute overhead for each
benchmark due to authorization contracts is less than 45ms,
but the relative overhead is high since the baseline running
time is less than 15ms. The third case study replaces existing
access control checks with authorization contracts, with
negligible impact on performance. Our implementation is
a prototype, and we anticipate that optimizations in the
implementation of our contracts can further reduce their
overhead.
Preventing Cheating in a Card Game We have used autho-
rization contracts to enforce a security policy for a functional
implementation of the card game Dominion4. The exact rules
of Dominion do not matter for our purpose, except that each
player collects cards in a local deck and attempts to outscore
the rest of the players by playing cards from their deck. Dur-
ing each turn, players can play cards from their deck to either
purchase additional cards or attack other players, forcing
them to discard some of their cards.
In this implementation, each player is a program that runs
in its own process and responds automatically to messages
from a central broker. The broker maintains the shared
inventory of cards and a mirror of each player’s local deck.
Players perform moves by sending messages to the broker
describing the move.
To perform a move, the player sends a message to the
broker identifying a card to play. In response, the broker
updates its copy of the game state to reflect the move and,
if the move involves an attack on another player, informs
the other player of the attack. The other player then has an
opportunity to defend by choosing which card to discard and
the broker again updates the game state.
The broker represents the local deck of each player as
an immutable record player and the state of the game as an
4 The implementation is part of the teaching material of a long running
undergraduate Functional Programming course.
immutable structure game that holds a list of player records.
The first element in this list corresponds to the player who
makes the next move. The broker is implemented as a core
drive function that delegates to two functions: move and
defend. Both functions perform functional updates to the
relevant structures.
We enforce the policy that the broker only updates the
current player’s deck or a defending player’s deck. The
monitor that enforces this policy specifies three authorization
contracts: deprivilege/c, which sets the principal for the
dynamic extent of a function to ⊥; (switch-player/c name),
which sets the principal for the dynamic extent of a function
to the player with name name; and (check-player/c name),
which checks before calling a function if the current principal
is the player with name name.
To enforce the policy, we attach contract deprivilege/c
to the function drive so that only authorized code can modify
the game state during the game. The contract for the game
structure, game/c, gives the accessor functions of each field of
the player records in the game the contract(check-player/c
name), where name is the name of the corresponding player.
The contract for the move function is
(->a







and it authorizes the move function to act on behalf of the cur-
rent player, i.e., (first (game-players game)). The contract
for defend is





which similarly allows the function to update the state of the
player who was attacked.
We created 10 benchmarks for the Dominion case study
that each consists of a simulated game with 2-7 players.
Adding authorization contracts increases running time by
1.3–1.7× at both the median and 99th percentile.
Securing a Plugin Interface We wrote a monitor to protect
DrRacket from malicious or buggy third-party key bindings.
First, we explain aspects of DrRacket’s design related to
key bindings. Keystrokes sent to DrRacket are dispatched
as method calls to a text% object which encapsulates the
state of the editor. This object has methods that access and
modify parts of DrRacket. For instance, the get-text method
returns the content of the editor, while the set-padding
method changes the inset padding used to display the editor’s
content. Each text% object has a keymap% object that stores
registered key bindings and maps sequences of keystrokes to
the action they trigger. A keybinding action is an arbitrary
Racket function of two arguments: the current text% object
and an event% object, which describes the event that triggered
the action. On startup, DrRacket populates its text% object’s
key map with built-in key bindings. In addition, DrRacket
registers user-defined key bindings from configuration files.
Keybinding actions can inspect and modify almost any aspect
of DrRacket through the text% object. This gives users a
powerful interface for customizing DrRacket but makes key
bindings a source of vulnerabilities. For instance, a key
binding could accidentally erase the user’s code or snoop
on the editing session.
Our monitor restricts which text% object methods a key-
binding action can invoke. We group methods of text% that
can access or modify similar parts of DrRacket. For instance,
methods that write to the clipboard (e.g. cut and copy) belong
to the same group while methods that change how DrRacket
displays content (e.g. set-max-width and set-line-spacing)
belong to a second group. Each group has a corresponding
privilege that is required to invoke the group’s methods. For
example, the privileges ReadClipboard and ChangeEditorView
grant access to the methods mentioned above. Methods can
belong to multiple groups. Access control checks around each
method verify that the authority of a calling execution context
has the necessary privileges.
In addition to methods that require specific privileges to
invoke, text% has sensitive methods that should be invoked
only by another method of the text% object. For example,
the on-delete method should never be invoked directly as
its correctness depends on DrRacket’s state. Instead, key
bindings should invoke the delete method that subsequently
calls on-delete. To support this use case, we require an
additional privilege to call on-delete that is granted during
the dynamic extent of delete.
The stack-inspection-like access control mechanism we
have described so far is not sufficient. Some methods of text%
install callbacks that are triggered by subsequent events. For
example, add-undo registers a callback that runs when the
user wishes to undo the action of a key binding. This callback
should not run with the authority of its calling context, but
instead should use the privileges of the action that created
it. To achieve this, we create authority closures around any
callbacks registered by an action.
Our monitor represents each privilege as a unique prin-
cipal and represents sets of principals as conjunctions and
disjunctions of principals. It defines three actions: check/c,
enable/c, and closure/c. Upon an #:on-apply event, the first
action consumes principal perms and checks if the current
principal has permissions that imply perms. Then the action
switches the current principal to a principal that only has
permissions perms. When a function wrapped with enable/c
is applied, it switches the current principal to a principal that
has the same permissions as the current principal augmented
with perms. The #:on-create event of the third action creates
an authority closure. When the authority closure is applied, it
installs the closed-over principal.
We use the actions of the monitor to define an authoriza-
tion contract for the keybinding interface:
(->a ([t text/c] [e (is-a?/c event%)])
#:auth () (check/c perms) any)
where perms is a principal which encodes the privileges we
grant to the key binding and text/c is the object contract we
define for the editor’s text% object. text/c applies a contract
to each method of text% specifying whether the method
enables some permission, requires some permissions, or
creates an authority closure around one of its arguments. For
example, text/c gives the method blink-caret the contract
(check/c ChangeEditorView). In essence, text/c defines a
security policy for the editor.
To assess the monitor’s performance, we ran a series of
30 benchmarks, adapted from DrRacket’s test suite, that
simulate a sequence of keystrokes that trigger built-in key
bindings. We ran these benchmarks with the monitor off
and on. When the monitor is on, the prototype grants the
minimum set of privileges necessary for each key binding. For
each benchmark, we measured the time required to retrieve
and execute each key binding. Our measurements show that
the authority monitor increases median response time by
3–7× and increases response time at the 99th percentile by
3–5×. However, for an IDE, a response time fast enough for
interactive use is more important. Our prototype achieves this
goal with a maximum response time of 53ms.
Authentication in a Web Application The Racket package
system allows users to discover and install packages from a
public index service. Individual users can add new packages
or update old ones by logging into the index service web ap-
plication, which is implemented using the Racket web-server.
Requests to add or modify packages are issued to the appli-
cation as asynchronous http requests. The baseline imple-
mentation of the application uses macros to authenticate the
user and perform any required access control checks before
processing the request. For example, the jsonp/pkg/modify
endpoint authenticates the current user and checks that they
are an author of the package they are attempting to modify.
This approach to access control is brittle, since it requires that
the checks included for each endpoint accurately capture the
privileges required when processing the response.
Using authorization contracts, we are able to separate the
tasks of authentication and authorization in the index service
web application. Rather than performing a different set of
access control checks for each endpoint, all endpoints now
simply invoke an authenticate function that checks whether
the current session is valid and which user is logged in, then
invokes a procedure to process the request, like the login
function from Section 2.2. The access control policies for
sensitive operations like updating a package are enforced by
adding authorization contracts that implement the necessary
checks to the web application’s data model. There are two
types of checks: (is-author/c pkg) which checks that the
logged in user is an author of package pkg, and is-curator/c,
which checks whether the logged in user has “curator” status,
which allows them to tag packages with information about
their quality.
To evaluate the new implementation’s performance, we
measured the latency of 1,000 repeated requests to modify
a package record. Replacing inline checks with authoriza-
tion contracts has minimal impact on performance. Median
latency was 283ms for the baseline implementation versus
281ms with authorization contracts. At the 99th percentile, us-
ing authorization contracts latency was 338ms versus 330ms
with the baseline implementation.
6. Related Work
The connection between scoping and access control has been
implicit in prior work on security in programming languages
but has never been a central concept for extensible access
control. Morris’s seminal paper “Protection in Programming
Languages” [31] describes how lexical scope can be used to
create security abstractions within a program. More recently,
the object-capability paradigm has embraced lexical scope
as an organizing security principle [27]. Wallach and Felten
[41] note that “in some ways, [stack inspection] resembles
dynamic variables (where free variables are resolved from
the caller’s environment rather than from the environment
in which the function is defined).” Phung et al. [32] use
dynamic and lexical scoping to associate principals with
executing code in order to correctly enforce security policies
on programs that mix JavaScript and ActionScript code.
Inlined Reference Monitors An alternative approach to
language-level access control is inlined reference monitoring.
Reference monitors observe the actions taken by a system
and intercede to prevent violations of a security policy [3].
They can enforce a large class of policies [34]. Inlined ref-
erence monitoring (IRM) weaves the implementation of a
reference monitor into the program being monitored [13].
Many implementations of inlined reference monitoring rely
on aspects to identify security relevant actions during pro-
gram execution [6, 7, 14, 15, 21]. Policies supported by these
tools typically focus on access patterns for sensitive resources.
While policies supported by our framework can be encoded
this way, as in Erlingsson and Schneider’s IRM implementa-
tion of Java stack inspection [14], policies where the authority
of code depends on application state require duplicating code.
A further disadvantage of IRMs is that they require a global
transformation of the program to inline the security monitor.
Because authorization contracts are applied at component
boundaries, our framework requires only local modifications.
Authorization Logics Authorization logics give a formal
language to express access control policies [1]. Authorization
logics have been used to understand existing access control
mechanisms, including Java stack inspection [41]. Aura [20]
and Fine [38] implement access control using proof-carrying
authentication, where proofs of formulas in an authorization
logic are used as capabilities [4]. Our access control logic is
inspired by the Flow-Limited Authorization Model [5], which
uses projections to describe attenuated authority without
requiring additional constructs such as roles or groups.
Contracts for Security Previous work has used contracts
to enforce limited access control policies. Moore et al. [29]
use contracts to constrain the use of capabilities in a secure
shell scripting language. Dimoulas et al. [10] use contracts to
control the flow of capabilities between components in object-
capability languages. Heidegger et al. [19] use contracts
to specify which fields of an object may be accessed by a
component. However, each of these systems is specialized
to enforce a specific type of access control policy. Disney
et al. [11] introduce temporal higher-order contracts that
enforce that sequences of function calls and returns match a
specification. Schollier et al.’s computational contracts [35]
can enforce a wide range of trace properties on programs.
Unlike authorization contracts and temporal higher-order
contracts, computational contracts use aspects to interpose
on program events. Both of these systems support arbitrarily
powerful monitors, but like inlined reference monitoring,
provide limited support for writing complex access control
policies like stack inspection or discretionary access control.
Scoped Aspects for Security Dutchyn et al. [12] are the
first to identify a connection between modular access con-
trol and the scoping of aspects that implement authorization
checks. They introduce constructs for lexical and dynamic
aspect scoping and use them to enforce a simple security
policy similar to the one we enforce in §2.3 with authoriza-
tion contracts. With additional aspect scoping mechanisms,
Toledo et al. [40] implement a complete Java stack inspection
mechanism in a modular fashion. The exact relation between
the expressiveness of scoped aspects and that of authorization
contracts is an open question. However, as our case studies
and example access control mechanisms demonstrate, autho-
rization contracts are powerful enough to enforce a variety of
access control policy classes with a single domain-specific
abstraction: authority environments. Doing the same with
aspects, if possible, requires brittle and complex encodings
in terms of general-purpose advice and aspect scoping.
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A. Details of Model
A.1 Evaluation Contexts
E ::= [·] | E e | v E | letx = E in e | if E then e else e | E ⊕ e | v ⊕ E | E ≤ e | v ≤ E
| make-parameter E | ?E | E := e | p(r) := E
| parameterizeE = e in e | parameterize p(r) = E in e | parameterize p(r) = v in E
| flat/c(E) | param/c(E) | E : τ → (e) e | c : τ → (E) e | c : τ → (c) E
| E : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e | c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) E | ctx/c(E,(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(E ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ E ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← E),(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,E,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(E ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ E ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← E),(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| `monkj (E,e) | `monkj (c,E) | checkkj (E,e)
| guardj (E,v,v,e) | install/pj (v,e,E) | install/pj (v,E,v)
| module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = v,. . . ,x = E,x = e,. . .; p
A.2 Typing Judgments
Σ ` p : τ
∅; Σ ` m1 . Γ1 . . . Γn−1; Σ ` mn . Γn Γn; Σ ` e : τ
` m1 ; . . .mn ; e : τ
Γ; Σ ` m . Γ′
∅; Σ ` e1 : τ1 . . . {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn−1 : τn−1}; Σ ` en : τn Γ′ = {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn} {x1,...,xn′}∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤n.xi ≡ yh ∧ τh 6= τ ctc ∧ τh 6= ctx ctc ∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤n.xci ≡ yh ∧ τh = τ ctc
Γ; Σ ` module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . , xn′ withxcn′ where y1 = e1,. . . , yn = en . Γ unionmulti Γ′
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` () : Unit Γ; Σ ` n : Int Γ; Σ ` #t : Bool Γ; Σ ` #f : Bool
Γ(x) = τ
Γ; Σ ` x : τ
Γ; Σ ` ei : Int i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ; Σ ` e1 ⊕ e2 : Int
Γ; Σ ` ei : Int i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ; Σ ` e1 ≤ e2 : Bool
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ1 Γ[x 7→ τ1]; Σ ` e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` letx = e1 in e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` ec : Bool Γ; Σ ` ei : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ; Σ ` if ec then e1 else e2 : τ
Γ[x 7→ τ1]; Σ ` e : τ2
Γ; Σ ` λx : τ1. e : τ1 → τ2
Γ[x 7→ τ ]; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` µx : τ. e : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ1 → τ2 Γ; Σ ` e2 : τ1
Γ; Σ ` e1 e2 : τ2
Σ(r) = τ
Γ; Σ ` p(r) : τ param
Γ; Σ ` e : τ param
Γ; Σ ` ?e : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ param Γ; Σ ` e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 := e2 : Unit
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` make-parameter e : τ param
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τp param Γ; Σ ` e2 : τp Γ; Σ ` e3 : τ
Γ; Σ ` parameterize e1 = e2 in e3 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ ctc Γ; Σ ` e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` `monkj (e1,e2) : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : ctx ctc Γ; Σ ` e2 : (τd → τr)
Γ; Σ ` `monkj (e1,e2) : (τd → τr)
Γ; Σ ` e1 : Bool Γ; Σ ` v2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` checkkj (e1,v2) : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : β → Bool
Γ; Σ ` flat/c(e) : β ctc
Γ; Σ ` e : τ ctc
Γ; Σ ` param/c(e) : (τ param) ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd ctc Γ; Σ ` er : τr ctc Γ; Σ ` ec : ctx ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd → (ec) er : τd → τr ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd ctc Γ; Σ ` er : τr ctc Γ[x 7→ τd]; Σ ` e : ctx ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd →a (λx : τd. e) er : τd → τr ctc
Γ; Σ ` e1 : Unit→ Bool Γ; Σ ` e2 : Unit→ Bool
Γ; Σ ` egci : Unit→ Bool Γ; Σ ` epci : τci param Γ; Σ ` evci : Unit→ τci
Γ; Σ ` egai : Unit→ Bool Γ; Σ ` epai : τai param Γ; Σ ` evai : Unit→ τai
Γ; Σ ` ctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . ) : ctx ctc
Γ; Σ ` ec : τ ctc Γ; Σ ` e : τ param
Γ; Σ ` `param/pkj (ec, e) : τ param
Γ; Σ ` eg : Bool Γ; Σ ` vp : τ param Γ; Σ ` vv : Unit→ τ Γ; Σ ` ef : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` guardj (eg,vp,vv,ef ) : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` vp : τ param Γ; Σ ` ev : τ Γ; Σ ` ef : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` install/pj (vp,ev,ef ) : τd → τr
A.3 Typing Judgments for Authorization Contract Extensions
Γ; Σ ` m . Γ′
a1, . . . , ao = actionxa1 (ya1 , . . .) (ce,ae), . . . , actionxao (yao , . . .) (ce,ae)
∅; Σ ` e1 : τ1 . . . {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn−1 : τn−1}; Σ ` en : τn
{y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn}; Σ ` a1 : τa1 . . . {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn, . . . , xa1 : τa1 , . . . , xao−1 : τao−1}; Σ ` ao : τao
{y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn, . . . , xa1 : τa1 , . . . , xao : τao}; Σ ` en+1 : τn+1
. . . {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn, . . . , xa1 : τa1 , . . . , xao : τao , yn+1 : τn+1, . . . , ym−1 : τn−1}; Σ ` em : τm
Γ′ = {y1 : τ1, . . . , ym : τn} {x1,...,xn′}∀1≤i≤n′ .(∃1≤h≤m.xi ≡ yh ∧ τh 6= τ ctc ∧ τh 6= ctx ctc) ∨ (∃1≤h≤o.xi ≡ xah ∧ τah 6= τ ctc ∧ τah 6= ctx ctc)
∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤m.xci ≡ yh ∧ τh = τ ctc
Γ; Σ ` module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . , xn′ withxcn′ where y1 = e1,. . . , yn = en,monitor (a1, . . . , ao), yk = ek,ym = em . Γ unionmulti Γ′
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` > : Prin Γ; Σ ` ⊥ : Prin Γ; Σ ` P : Prin Γ; Σ ` D : Dim Γ; Σ ` new-principal : Prin
Γ; Σ ` new-dimension : Dim
Γ; Σ ` ep : Prin Γ; Σ ` ed : Dim
Γ; Σ ` ep . ed : Prin Γ; Σ ` {} : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` e : Del
Γ; Σ ` {e} : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` e1 : DelSet Γ; Σ ` e2 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` e1 ∪ e2 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` e1 : DelSet Γ; Σ ` e2 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` e1 \ e2 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` ew : DelSet Γ; Σ ` ef : (τ → (Del→ τ)) Γ; Σ ` ei : τ
Γ; Σ ` (fold ew ef ei) : τ
Γ; Σ ` ew : DelSet Γ; Σ ` es : Prin Γ; Σ ` el : Prin Γ; Σ ` er : Prin
Γ; Σ ` ew ; es ` el er : τ
Γ; Σ ` es : Prin Γ; Σ ` el : Prin Γ; Σ ` er : Prin
Γ; Σ ` es  el @ er : Del
Γ; Σ ` ea : Del Γ[xs 7→ Prin, xl 7→ Prin, xr 7→ Prin]; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` letxs  xl @ xr = ea in e : τ
Γ[y1 7→ τ1, . . . , yn 7→ τn]; Σ ` ce Γ[y1 7→ τ1, . . . , yn 7→ τn]; Σ ` ae
Γ; Σ ` actionx (y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn) (ce,ae) : (τ1 → (. . .→ (τn → ctx ctc)))
Γ; Σ ` ce
Γ; Σ ` cee1 : Del Γ; Σ ` cee2 : DelSet Γ; Σ ` cee3 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` cee4 : Prin Γ; Σ ` cee5 : Prin Γ; Σ ` cee6 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` check: cee1 add: cee2 remove: cee3 set!-principal: ceee4 closure-principal: cee5 closure-delegations: cee6
Γ; Σ ` ae
Γ; Σ ` aee1 : Del Γ; Σ ` aee2 : DelSet Γ; Σ ` aee3 : DelSet Γ; Σ ` aee4 : DelSet
Γ; Σ ` aee5 : Prin Γ; Σ ` aee6 : Prin Γ; Σ ` aee7 : Prin
Γ; Σ ` check: aee1 add: aee2 remove: aee3 scope: aeee4 set-principal?: aee5 principal: aee6 set!-principal: aee7
Γ; Σ ` cee : τ Γ; Σ ` aee : τ
Γ; Σ ` aeev : τx Γ[x 7→ τx]; Σ ` aee : τ
Γ; Σ ` letx = aeev in aee : τ
Γ; Σ ` ceev : τx Γ[x 7→ τx]; Σ ` cee : τ
Γ; Σ ` letx = ceev in cee : τ Γ; Σ ` current-principal : Prin
Γ; Σ ` current-delegations : DelSet Γ; Σ ` closure-principal : Prin Γ; Σ ` closure-delegations : DelSet
A.4 Compiling Authorization Contract Extensions
compileJmodule ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e2,. . .; pK =
compile-monitorJmodule ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e2,. . .; compileJpKK
compileJeK = e
compile-monitorJmodule `
exports x1 withxc1 , . . .
where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,
monitor (actionxa1 (ya1 : τya1 , . . .) (ce1,ae1), . . . , actionxan (yan : τyan , . . .) (cen,aen)),
yn+1 = en+1,. . . ,ym = em;K =
module `
exports x1 withxc1 , . . .
where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,
p = make-parameter >,d = make-parameter {},s = make-parameter {},
cp = make-parameter >,cd = make-parameter {},
curp = make-parameter >,curd = make-parameter {},
xa1 = compile-actionJactionxa1 (ya1 : τya1 , . . .) (ce1,ae1), p, d, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK,
. . . ,
xan = compile-actionJactionxan (yan : τyan , . . .) (cen,aen), p, d, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK,
yn+1 = en+1,. . . ,ym = em;
where p, d, s, cp, cd, curp, and curd are fresh
compile-actionJactionx (y : τy, . . .) (ce,ae), p, d, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK =
λ y : τy. . . . .
ctx/c(compile-cecheckJce, p, d, s, curp, curdK,
compile-cecpJce, cp, curp, curdK,
compile-cecdJce, cd, curp, curdK,
compile-aecheckJae, p, d, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK,
compile-aesJae, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK,
compile-aepJae, p, cp, cd, curp, curdK)
compile-cecheckJcheck: e1 add: e2 remove: e3 set!-principal: e4 closure-principal: e5 closure-delegations: e6, p, d, s, curp, curdK =
λ _ : Unit.
let _ = curp := ?p in
let _ = curd := ?d ∪ ?s in
let p1  p2 @ p3 = compile-ceeJe1, curp, curdK in
if (?curd) ; p3 ` p1 p2 then
let add = compile-ceeJe2, curp, curdK in
let remove = compile-ceeJe3, curp, curdK in
let setprin = compile-ceeJe4, curp, curdK in
let _ = d := (?d ∪ add)/remove in
let _ = p := setprin in
#t
else #f
compile-cecpJcheck: e1 add: e2 remove: e3 set!-principal: e4 closure-principal: e5 closure-delegations: e6, cp, curp, curdK =
((λ _ : Unit. #t)⇒ cp← (λ _ : Unit. compile-ceeJe5, curp, curdK))
compile-cecdJcheck: e1 add: e2 remove: e3 set!-principal: e4 closure-principal: e5 closure-delegations: e6, cd, curp, curdK =
((λ _ : Unit. #t)⇒ cd← (λ _ : Unit. compile-ceeJe6, curp, curdK))
compile-aecheckJcheck: e1 add: e2 remove: e3 scope: e4 set-principal?: e5 principal: e6 set!-principal: e7, p, d, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK =
λ _ : Unit.
let _ = curp := ?p in
let _ = curd := ?d ∪ ?s in
let p1  p2 @ p3 = compile-aeeJe1, curp, curd, cp, cdK in
if (?curd) ; p3 ` p1 p2 then
let add = compile-aeeJe2, curp, curd, cp, cdK in
let remove = compile-aeeJe3, curp, curd, cp, cdK in
let setprin = compile-aeeJe7, curp, curd, cp, cdK in
let _ = d := (?d ∪ add)/remove in
let _ = p := setprin in
#t
else #f
compile-aepJcheck: e1 add: e2 remove: e3 scope: e4 set-principal?: e5 principal: e6 set!-principal: e7, p, cp, cd, curp, curdK =
(compile-aeeJe5, curp, curd, cp, cdK⇒ p← compile-aeeJe6, curp, curd, cp, cdK)
compile-aesJcheck: e1 add: e2 remove: e3 scope: e4 set-principal?: e5 principal: e6 set!-principal: e7, s, cp, cd, curp, curdK =
((λ _ : Unit. #t)⇒ s← compile-aeeJe4, curp, curd, cp, cdK)
compile-ceeJletx = cee1 in cee2, curp, curdK = let x = compile-ceeJcee1, curp, curdK
in compile-ceeJcee2, curp, curdK
compile-aeeJletx = aee1 in aee2, curp, curd, cp, cdK = let x = compile-aeeJaee1, curp, curd, cp, clodK
in compile-aeeJaee2, curp, curd, cp, cdK
compile-ceeJcurrent-principal, curp, curdK = ?curp
compile-aeeJcurrent-principal, curp, curd, cp, cdK = ?curp
compile-ceeJcurrent-delegations, curp, curdK = ?curd
compile-aeeJcurrent-delegations, curp, curd, cp, cdK = ?curd
compile-aeeJclosure-principal, curp, curd, cp, cdK = ?cp
compile-aeeJclosure-delegations, curp, curd, cp, cdK = ?cd
compile-ceeJe, curp, curdK = e
compile-aeeJe, curp, curd, cp, cdK = e
A.5 Authorization Contract Extension Evaluation Contexts
E ::= . . . | E . e | v . c | E ; e ` e e | v ;E ` e e | v ; v ` E e | v ; v ` v E
| E  e @ e | v  E @ e | v  v @ E | {E} | E ∪ e | v ∪ E | E \ e | v \ E
| (fold E e e) | (fold v E e) | (fold v v E)
A.6 Reduction Semantics for Authorization Contract Extensions
〈E[new-principal], σ〉 → 〈E[p], σ〉 where p is fresh
〈E[new-dimension], σ〉 → 〈E[d], σ〉 where d is fresh
〈E[{p1s  p1l @ p1r , . . .} ; ps ` pl pr], σ〉 → 〈E[#t], σ〉 if {p1l  p1r @ p1s , . . .} ; ps ` pl pr
〈E[{p1s  p1l @ p1r , . . .} ; ps ` pl pr], σ〉 → 〈E[#f], σ〉 if {p1l  p1r @ p1s , . . .}; ps 6` pl pr
〈E[{v11 , . . . , v1n} ∪ {v21 , . . . , v2m}], σ〉 → 〈E[{v31 , . . . , v3k}], σ〉
where {v31 , . . . , v3k} = {v11 , . . . , v1n} ∪ {v21 , . . . , v2m}
〈E[{v11 , . . . , v1n} \ {v21 , . . . , v2m}], σ〉 → 〈E[{v31 , . . . , v3k}], σ〉
where {v31 , . . . , v3k} = {v11 , . . . , v1n} \ {v21 , . . . , v2m}
〈E[(fold {} vf v)], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉
〈E[(fold {v1, v2, . . .} vf v)], σ〉 → 〈E[(fold {v2, . . .} vf ((vf v) v1))], σ〉
〈E[letxs  xl @ xr = vs  vl @ vr in e], σ〉 → 〈E[{vl,vr,vs/xl,xr,xs}e], σ〉
B. Proof of complete monitoring
This appendix demonstrates that CtxPCF satisfies complete monitoring. Complete monitoring states that a contract system correctly assigns
blame to components that violate their contracts and, crucially, that the contract system can interpose on all uses of a value in a component that
did not create that value. We follow Dimoulas et. al’s standard techniques for stating and proving complete monitoring. The formalization has
two key aspects:
1. We develop an independent mechanism to provide a ground truth for ownership of values. To accomplish this, we devise an annotated
version of the CtxPCF semantics that has the same behavior, but also keeps track of ownership by annotating values as they flow from one
component to another. To ensure that the annotated semantics is truly an independent system for tracking ownership, the semantic rules
that implement contract boundaries do not modify ownership annotations on values that flow through contracts.
2. The semantics of the annotated language are modified so that programs get stuck when a component accesses a “foreign” value, i.e., a
value from another component that is not protected by the contract system.
Using this annotated semantics, complete monitoring can be stated as a soundness property that states that well-formed programs (those whose
initial ownership annotations agree with the placement of contracts in the surface program) do not get stuck because components access
“foreign” values. Using a straightforward subject-reduction technique, we show that CtxPCF (and Ctrl+CtxPCF, its extension with first-class
control operators) satisfies complete monitoring.
B.1 Surface CtxPCF
B.1.1 Surface Programs
p ::= m ; p | e
m ::= module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = e,. . .
e ::= x | v | e e | µx : τ. e | letx = e in e | if e then e else e | e⊕ e | e ≤ e
| make-parameter e | parameterize e = e in e | ?e | e := e
| flat/c(e) | param/c(e) | e : τ → (e) e | e : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e
| ctx/c(e,(e⇒ e← e) . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e) . . . )
v ::= () | n | #t | #f | λx : τ. e | c
c ::= flat/c(v) | param/c(c) | c : τ → (c) c | c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) c
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )
τ ::= β | τ → τ | τ param | τ ctc | ctx ctc
β ::= Unit | Int | Bool
B.1.2 Well-typed Surface Programs
` p : τ
∅ ` m1 . Γ1 . . . Γn−1 ` mn . Γn Γn ` e : τ
` m1 ; . . .mn ; e : τ
Γ ` m . Γ′
∅ ` e1 : τ1 . . . {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn−1 : τn−1} ` en : τn Γ′ = {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn} {x1,...,xn′}∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤n.xi ≡ yh ∧ τh 6= τ ctc ∧ τh 6= ctx ctc ∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤n.xci ≡ yh ∧ τh = τ ctc
Γ ` module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . , xn′ withxcn′ where y1 = e1,. . . , yn = en . Γ unionmulti Γ′
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` () : Unit Γ ` n : Int Γ ` #t : Bool Γ ` #f : Bool
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ` x : τ
Γ ` ei : Int i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ` e1 ⊕ e2 : Int
Γ ` ei : Int i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ` e1 ≤ e2 : Bool
Γ ` e1 : τ1 Γ[x 7→ τ1] ` e2 : τ
Γ ` letx = e1 in e2 : τ
Γ ` ec : Bool Γ ` ei : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ` if ec then e1 else e2 : τ
Γ[x 7→ τ1] ` e : τ2
Γ ` λx : τ1. e : τ1 → τ2
Γ[x 7→ τ ] ` e : τ
Γ ` µx : τ. e : τ
Γ ` e1 : τ1 → τ2 Γ ` e2 : τ1
Γ ` e1 e2 : τ2
Γ ` e : τ param
Γ ` ?e : τ
Γ ` e1 : τ param Γ ` e2 : τ
Γ ` e1 := e2 : Unit
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` make-parameter e : τ param
Γ ` e1 : τp param Γ ` e2 : τp Γ ` e3 : τ
Γ ` parameterize e1 = e2 in e3 : τ
Γ ` e : β → Bool
Γ ` flat/c(e) : β ctc
Γ ` e : τ ctc
Γ ` param/c(e) : (τ param) ctc
Γ ` ed : τd ctc Γ ` er : τr ctc Γ ` ec : ctx ctc
Γ ` ed : τd → (ec) er : τd → τr ctc
Γ ` ed : τd ctc Γ ` er : τr ctc Γ[x 7→ τd] ` e : ctx ctc
Γ ` ed : τd →a (λx : τd. e) er : τd → τr ctc
Γ ` e1 : Unit→ Bool Γ ` e2 : Unit→ Bool
Γ ` egci : Unit→ Bool Γ ` epci : τci param Γ ` evci : Unit→ τci
Γ ` egai : Unit→ Bool Γ ` epai : τai param Γ ` evai : Unit→ τai
Γ ` ctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . ) : ctx ctc
B.2 Annotated Surface CtxPCF
B.2.1 Annotated Surface Programs
e ::= . . . | `〈〈`x〉〉
B.2.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated Surface Programs
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` x : τ
Γ ` `〈〈kx〉〉 : τ
B.2.3 Well-formed Annotated Surface Programs
`0  p
∅  m1 B∆1 . . . ∆n−1  mn B∆n ∆n; `0  e
`0  m1 ; . . .mn ; e
∆  mB∆′
∅; `  e1 . . . {y1 : `, . . . , yn−1 : `}; `  en Γ′ = {y1 : `, . . . , yn : `} {x1,...,xn′}
∆  module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . , xn′ withxcn′ where y1 = e1,. . . , yn = en B∆ unionmulti∆′
∆; `  e
∆; `  () ∆; `  n ∆; `  #t ∆; `  #f
∆(x) = `
∆; `  x
∆; `  ei i ∈ {1, 2}
∆; `  e1 ⊕ e2
∆; `  ei i ∈ {1, 2}
∆; `  e1 ≤ e2
∆; `  e1 ∆[x 7→ `]; Π  `e2
∆; `  letx = e1 in e2
∆; `  ec ∆; `  ei i ∈ {1, 2}
∆; `  if ec then e1 else e2
∆[x 7→ `]; `  e
∆; `  λx : τ. e
∆[x 7→ `]; `  e
∆; `  µx : τ. e
∆; `  e1 ∆; `  e2
∆; `  e1 e2
∆; `  e
∆; `  ?e
∆; `  e1 ∆; `  e2
∆; `  e1 := e2
∆; `  e
∆; `  make-parameter e
∆; `  e1 ∆; `  e2 ∆; `  e3
∆; `  parameterize e1 = e2 in e3
∆; `  e
∆; `  flat/c(e)
∆; `  e
∆; `  param/c(e)
∆; `  e1 ∆; `  e2 ∆; `  e3
∆; `  e1 : τ →a (λx : τ. e2) e3
∆; `  e1 ∆; `  e2 ∆; `  e3
∆; `  e1 : τ → (e2) e3
∆; `  e1 ∆; `  e2 ∆; `  egci ∆; `  epci ∆; `  evci ∆; `  egai ∆; `  epai ∆; `  evai
∆; `  ctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . )
∆; k  x
∆; `  `〈〈kx〉〉
B.3 CtxPCF
B.3.1 Programs
p ::= m ; p | e
m ::= module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = e,. . .
e ::= v | e e | µx : τ. e | letx = e in e | if e then e else e | e⊕ e | e ≤ e
| make-parameter e | parameterize e = e in e | ?e | e := e
| flat/c(e) | param/c(e) | e : τ → (e) e | e : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e
| ctx/c(e,(e⇒ e← e) . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e) . . . )
| `monkj (e,e) | guardj (e,v,v,e) | install/pj (v,e,e) | checkkj (e,e) | errorkj
v ::= () | n | #t | #f | λx : τ. e | c | p(r)
| `param/pkj (c, v) | `ctx/pkj (v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . .,v) | install/pj (v,v,v)
c ::= flat/c(v) | param/c(c) | c : τ → (c) c | c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) c
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )
τ ::= β | τ → τ | τ param | τ ctc | ctx ctc
β ::= Unit | Int | Bool
B.3.2 Well-typed Programs
Σ ` p : τ
∅; Σ ` m1 . Γ1 . . . Γn−1; Σ ` mn . Γn Γn; Σ ` e : τ
` m1 ; . . .mn ; e : τ
Γ; Σ ` m . Γ′
∅; Σ ` e1 : τ1 . . . {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn−1 : τn−1}; Σ ` en : τn Γ′ = {y1 : τ1, . . . , yn : τn} {x1,...,xn′}∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤n.xi ≡ yh ∧ τh 6= τ ctc ∧ τh 6= ctx ctc ∀1≤i≤n′ .∃1≤h≤n.xci ≡ yh ∧ τh = τ ctc
Γ; Σ ` module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . , xn′ withxcn′ where y1 = e1,. . . , yn = en . Γ unionmulti Γ′
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` () : Unit Γ; Σ ` n : Int Γ; Σ ` #t : Bool Γ; Σ ` #f : Bool
Γ(x) = τ
Γ; Σ ` x : τ
Γ; Σ ` ei : Int i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ; Σ ` e1 ⊕ e2 : Int
Γ; Σ ` ei : Int i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ; Σ ` e1 ≤ e2 : Bool
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ1 Γ[x 7→ τ1]; Σ ` e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` letx = e1 in e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` ec : Bool Γ; Σ ` ei : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ; Σ ` if ec then e1 else e2 : τ
Γ[x 7→ τ1]; Σ ` e : τ2
Γ; Σ ` λx : τ1. e : τ1 → τ2
Γ[x 7→ τ ]; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` µx : τ. e : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ1 → τ2 Γ; Σ ` e2 : τ1
Γ; Σ ` e1 e2 : τ2
Σ(r) = τ
Γ; Σ ` p(r) : τ param
Γ; Σ ` e : τ param
Γ; Σ ` ?e : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ param Γ; Σ ` e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 := e2 : Unit
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` make-parameter e : τ param
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τp param Γ; Σ ` e2 : τp Γ; Σ ` e3 : τ
Γ; Σ ` parameterize e1 = e2 in e3 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : β → Bool
Γ; Σ ` flat/c(e) : β ctc
Γ; Σ ` e : τ ctc
Γ; Σ ` param/c(e) : (τ param) ctc
Γ; Σ ` e : (typd → τr) ctc
Γ; Σ ` tag/c(e) : ((τd → τr) tag) ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd ctc Γ; Σ ` er : τr ctc Γ; Σ ` ec : ctx ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd → (ec) er : τd → τr ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd ctc Γ; Σ ` er : τr ctc Γ[x 7→ τd]; Σ ` e : ctx ctc
Γ; Σ ` ed : τd →a (λx : τd. e) er : τd → τr ctc
Γ; Σ ` e1 : Unit→ Bool Γ; Σ ` e2 : Unit→ Bool
Γ; Σ ` egci : Unit→ Bool Γ; Σ ` epci : τci param Γ; Σ ` evci : Unit→ τci
Γ; Σ ` egai : Unit→ Bool Γ; Σ ` epai : τai param Γ; Σ ` evai : Unit→ τai
Γ; Σ ` ctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . ) : ctx ctc
Γ; Σ ` e1 : τ ctc Γ; Σ ` e2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` `monkj (e1,e2) : τ
Γ; Σ ` e1 : ctx ctc Γ; Σ ` e2 : (τd → τr)
Γ; Σ ` `monkj (e1,e2) : (τd → τr)
Γ; Σ ` e1 : Bool Γ; Σ ` v2 : τ
Γ; Σ ` checkkj (e1,v2) : τ
Γ; Σ ` ec : τ ctc Γ; Σ ` e : τ param
Γ; Σ ` `param/pkj (ec, e) : τ param
Γ; Σ ` eg : Bool Γ; Σ ` vp : τ param Γ; Σ ` vv : Unit→ τ Γ; Σ ` ef : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` guardj (eg,vp,vv,ef ) : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` vp : τ param Γ; Σ ` ev : τ Γ; Σ ` ef : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` install/pj (vp,ev,ef ) : τd → τr
Γ; Σ ` σ
dom(Σ) = dom(σ) ∀p ∈ dom(σ),Γ; Σ ` Σ(p) : σ(p)
Γ; Σ ` σ
B.3.3 Evaluation Contexts
Note. Values v appearing in evaluation contexts are closed terms.
E ::= [·] | E e | v E | letx = E in e | if E then e else e | E ⊕ e | v ⊕ E
| E ≤ e | v ≤ E | make-parameter E | ?E | E := e | p(r) := E
| parameterizeE = e in e | parameterize p(r) = E in e | parameterize p(r) = v in E
| flat/c(E) | param/c(E) | tag/c(E)
| E : τ → (e) e | c : τ → (E) e | c : τ → (c) E
| E : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e | c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) E
| ctx/c(E,(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(E ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ E ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← E),(e⇒ e← e), . . . ,e,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,E,(e⇒ e← e), . . . )τ
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(E ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ E ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← E),(e⇒ e← e), . . . )
| `monkj (E,e) | `monkj (c,E) | checkkj (E,e)
| guardj (E,v,v,e) | install/pj (v,e,E) | install/pj (v,E,v)
| module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = v,. . . ,x = E,x = e,. . .; p
B.3.4 Reduction Semantics
〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = e1,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉
→ 〈module ` exports x
1
withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = {vi/yi}e1,ye2 = e2,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉
〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where . . . ,x1 = v1,. . . ,xc1 = c1,. . .; p, σ〉
→ 〈importJ`,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),pK, σ〉
〈E[(λx : τ. e) v], σ〉 → 〈E[{v/x}e], σ〉
〈E[µx : τ. e], σ〉 → 〈E[{µx:τ. e/x}e], σ〉
〈E[letx = v in e], σ〉 → 〈E[{v/x}e], σ〉
〈E[if #t then e1 else e2], σ〉 → 〈E[e1], σ〉
〈E[if #f then e1 else e2], σ〉 → 〈E[e2], σ〉
〈E[v1 ⊕ v2], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉 where v = v1 ⊕ v2
〈E[v1 ≤ v2], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉 where v = v1 ≤ v2
〈E[make-parameter v], σ〉 → 〈E[p(r)], σ[r 7→ v]〉 where r is fresh in σ
〈E[?p(r)], σ〉 → 〈v, σ〉 where σ(r) = v and
E does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′
〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in E′[?r]], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in E′[v]], σ〉
where E′ does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′′
〈E[p(r) := v], σ〉 → 〈E[()], σ[r 7→ v]〉
where E does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′
〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in E′[p(r) := v′]], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize p(r) = v′ in E′[v′]], σ〉
where E′ does not contain parameterize p(r) = v′′ in E′′
〈E[parameterize p(r) = v in v′], σ〉 → 〈E[v′], σ〉
〈E[`monkj (flat/c(vc),v)], σ〉 → 〈E[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ〉
〈E[`monkj (param/c(c),v)], σ〉 → 〈E[`param/pkj (c, v)], σ〉
〈E[`monkj (cd : τ → (cc) cr,v)], σ〉 → 〈E[(`monkj (cc,λ x : τd. `monkj (cr,vf kmon`j(cd,x))) v)], σ〉
where x is fresh
〈E[`monkj (cd : τ →a (λx : τ. ec) cr,v)], σ〉
→ 〈E[λ y : τd. `monkj ({
kmon`j(cd,y)/x}ec,`monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,y)))], σ〉 where y is fresh
〈E[`monkj (ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . ),v)], σ〉→ 〈E[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ〉
where e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v)))
〈E[(`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf ) v)], σ〉→ 〈E[(check`j((va ()),e) v)], σ〉
where e = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf ))
〈E[guardj (#f,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 → 〈E[ef ], σ〉
〈E[guardj (#t,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 → 〈E[install/pj (vp,(vv ()),ef )], σ〉
〈E[(install/pj (vp,vv,vf ) v)], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize vp = vv in (vf v)], σ〉
〈E[?`param/pkj (c, vp)], σ〉 → 〈E[`monkj (c,?vp)], σ〉
〈E[parameterize `param/pkj (c, vp) = v in e], σ〉 → 〈E[parameterize vp = kmon`j(c,v) in e], σ〉
〈E[`param/pkj (c, vp) := v], σ〉 → 〈E[vp := kmon`j(c,v)], σ〉
〈E[checkkj (#t,e)], σ〉 → 〈E[e], σ〉
〈E[checkkj (#f,v)], σ〉 → 〈errorkj , σ〉
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),m1; . . . ;mn;eK =
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),m1K;
. . . ;
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),mnK;
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),eK
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = enK =
module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = {
`monkk(ci,vi)/xi}e1,. . . ,yn = {
`monkk(ci,vi)/xi}en
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),eK = {`0monkk(ci,vi)/xi}e
B.4 Annotated CtxPCF
B.4.1 Annotated CtxPCF Programs
e ::= . . . | `〈〈`x〉〉 | |`e| | `〈`e〉 | bec~`
v ::= . . . | |`v| | `〈`v〉
c ::= . . . | |`. . . |`′flat/c(v)| . . .| | |`. . . |`′param/c(c)| . . .| | |`. . . |`′c : τ → (c) c| . . .|
| |`. . . |`′c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) c| . . .| | |`. . . |`′ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )| . . .|
| b|`. . . |`′flat/c(v)| . . .|c~` | b|`. . . |`′ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )| . . .|c~`
B.4.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated CtxPCF Programs
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` x : τ
Γ; Σ ` `〈〈kx〉〉 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` |`e| : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` `〈ke〉 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` bec~` : τ
B.4.3 Annotated Evaluation Contexts
Note We write ‖`e‖ to denote that the ownership annotations (if present) in e are consistent with ownership by `. That is, either
e has no ownership annotations or all ownership annotations in e have owner `: ‖`e‖ = |`. . . ‖`e‖ . . .| where for all labels k and
terms e′, e 6= ‖ke′‖.
E` ::= F `
E`0 ::= F
F ::= [·] | F e | v F | letx = F in e | if F then e else e | F ⊕ e | v ⊕ F
| F ≤ e | v ≤ F | make-parameter F | ?F | F := e | p(r) := F
| parameterizeF = e in e | parameterize ‖`′′p(r)‖ = F in e | parameterize ‖`p(r)‖ = v in F
| flat/c(F ) | param/c(F ) | F : τ → (e) e | c : τ → (F ) e | c : τ → (v) F
| F : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e | c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) F
| →ctx : τ (F , (e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(F ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ F ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← F ),(e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., F , (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(F ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ F ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← F ),(e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| install/pj (v,v,F ) | bF c~k
F ` ::= F ` e | v F ` | letx = F ` in e | if E then e else e | F ` ⊕ e | v ⊕ F `
| F ` ≤ e | v ≤ F ` | make-parameter F ` | ?F ` | jBl[F := e] | jBl[p(r) := F ]
| jBk[F ` := e] | jBk[p(r) := F `] | parameterizeF ` = e in e | jBk[parameterize ‖`′′p(r)‖ = F ` in k′Bj′ [e]]
| jBk[parameterize ‖`′′p(r)‖ = v in k′Bj′ [F `]] | jBl[parameterize ‖`′′p(r)‖ = F in k′Bj′ [e]]
| jBk[parameterize ‖`′′p(r)‖ = v in k′Bl[F ]]
| flat/c(F `) | param/c(F `) | F ` : τ → (e) e | c : τ → (F `) e | c : τ → (v) F `
| F ` : τ →a (λx : τ. e) e | c : τ →a (λx : τ. e) F `
| →ctx : τ (F `, (e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(F ` ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ F ` ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← F `),(e⇒ e← e), . . ., e, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., F `, (e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(F ` ⇒ e← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ F ` ← e),(e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| →ctx : τ (v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . ., v, (v ⇒ v ← v), . . . ,(v ⇒ v ← F `),(e⇒ e← e), . . .)
| `′mon`j(c,F ) | `
′
monkj (c,F




| checkk` (F ,e) | checkkj (F `,e) | guard` (F ,v,v,e) | guardj (F `,v,v,e)
| install/p` (v,F ,v) | install/pj (v,F `,v) | install/pj (v,v,F `)
| ‖`F‖ | ‖`′F `‖ | bF `c~k
| module ` exports xwithx,. . . where x = v,. . . ,x = F ,x = e,. . .; p
| module `′ exports xwithx,. . . where x = v,. . . ,x = F `,x = e,. . .; p
`Bk ::= `〈k[·]〉
`B` ::= `〈`[·]〉
B.4.4 Annotated Reduction Semantics
〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = e1,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉
→ann 〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yi = vi,ye1 = {vn/yn}e1,ye2 = e2,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉
〈module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where . . . ,xv1 = v1,. . . ,xc1 = c1,. . .; p, σ〉
→ 〈importJ`,xv1 ,v1,c1,. . . importJ`,xvn ,vn,cn,pKK, σ〉
〈E`[‖`λx : τ. e‖ ‖`v‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[{|`v|/x}e], σ〉
〈E`[µx : τ. e], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[{|`µx:τ. e|/x}e], σ〉
〈E`[letx = ‖`v‖ in e], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[{|`v|/x}e], σ〉
〈E`[if ‖`#t‖ then e1 else e2], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[e1], σ〉
〈E`[if ‖`#f‖ then e1 else e2], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[e2], σ〉
〈E`[‖`v1‖ ⊕ ‖`v2‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v|], σ〉 where v = v1 ⊕ v2
〈E`[‖`v1‖ ≤ ‖`v2‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v|], σ〉 where v = v1 ≤ v2
〈E`[make-parameter ‖`v‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`p(r)|], σ[r 7→ v]〉 where r is fresh in σ
〈E`[?‖`p(r)‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v|], σ〉
where σ(r) = v and E does not contain parameterize `
′
Bk[p(r)] = v′ in k2B`
′
2 [E′]
〈E`[`Bk[parameterize ‖kp(r)‖ = ‖kv‖ in kB`[E′k[?‖kp(r)‖]]]], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[`Bk[parameterize |kp(r)| = |kv| in kB`[E′k[|kv|]]]], σ〉
where E′`
′




[parameterize ‖k∗p(r)‖ = v′ in k∗2B`∗2 [E′′`′′ ]]
〈E`[`Bk[‖kp(r)‖ := ‖kv‖]], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`()|], σ[r 7→ v]〉




[parameterize ‖k∗p(r)‖ = v′ in k∗2B`∗2 [E′`′ ]]
〈E`[`Bk[parameterize ‖kp(r)‖ = ‖kv‖ in kB`[E′`′ [`′B′k[‖kp(r)‖ := ‖kv′‖]]]]], σ〉









[parameterize ‖k∗p(r)‖ = v′′ in k∗2B`∗2 [E′′`′′ ]]
〈E`[`Bk[parameterize ‖kp(r)‖ = ‖kv‖ in kB′`[v′]]], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[|`v′|], σ〉
〈E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ〉
〈E`[`monkj (‖jparam/c(c)‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`param/pkj (c, v)], σ〉
〈E`[`monkj (‖jcd : τ → (cc) cr‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`monkj (cc,λ x : τd. `monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,x)))], σ〉
where x is fresh
〈E`[`monkj (‖jcd : τ →a (λx : τ. ec) cr‖,v)], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[λ y : τd. `monkj ({
kmon`j(cd,y)/x}ec,`monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,y)))], σ〉 where y is fresh
〈E`[`monkj (b‖jctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`
,v)], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ〉
where e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v)))
〈E`[(‖``ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v)], σ〉→ann 〈E`[(check`j((va ()),e) v)], σ〉
where e = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf ))
〈E`[guardj (‖k#f‖,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[ef ], σ〉
〈E`[guardj (‖k#t‖,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[install/pj (vp,(vv ()),ef )], σ〉
〈E`[(‖`install/pj (vp,vv,vf )‖ v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`〈jparameterize vp = vv in j〈`(vf v)〉〉], σ〉
〈E`[?‖``param/pkj (c, vp)‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`monkj (c,?vp)], σ〉
〈E`[`B`′ [parameterize ‖`′`′param/pkj (c, vp)‖ = v in `
′
B′`[e]]], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[`〈kparameterize vp = kmon`′j (c,v) in k〈`e〉〉], σ〉
〈E`[`B`′ [`′param/pkj (c, vp) := v]], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`〈kvp := kmon`
′
j (c,v)〉], σ〉
〈E`[checkkj (‖j#t‖,e)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[e], σ〉
〈E`[checkkj (‖j#f‖,e)], σ〉 →ann 〈errorkj , σ〉
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),m1; . . . ;mn;eK =
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),m1K;
. . . ;
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),mnK;
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),eK
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = enK =
module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = {
`monkk(oblJci,{k},{`},kK,|kvi|)/`〈〈kxi〉〉}e1,
. . . ,
yn = {`monkk(oblJci,{k},{`},kK,|kvi|)/`〈〈kxi〉〉}en
importJk,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),eK = {`0monkk(oblJci,{k},{`0},kK,|kvi|)/`0 〈〈kxi〉〉}e
oblJflat/c(v),~k,~`,jK = bflat/c(v)c~k
oblJparam/c(c),~k,~`,jK = param/c(oblJc,~k~`,~k~`,jK)
oblJcd : τ → (cc) cr,~k,~`,jK = oblJcd,~`,~k,jK : τ → (oblJcc,~k,~`,jK) oblJcr,~k,~`,jK
oblJcd : τ →a (λx : τ. e) cr,~k,~`,jK = oblJcd,~`j,~k,jK : τ →a (λx : τ. bec~`) oblJcr,~k,~`,jK
oblJctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ),~k,~`,jK = bctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )c~`
B.4.5 Well-formed Annotated Programs
`0; Π  p
∅; Π  m1 B∆1 . . . ∆n−1; Π  mn B∆n ∆n; Π; `0  e
`0; Π  m1 ; . . .mn ; e
∆; Π  mB∆′
∅; Π; `  e1 . . . {y1 : `, . . . , yn−1 : `}; Π; `  en Γ′ = {y1 : `, . . . , yn : `} {x1,...,xn′}
∆; Π  module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . , xn′ withxcn′ where y1 = e1,. . . , yn = en B∆ unionmulti∆′
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  () ∆; Π; `  n ∆; Π; `  #t ∆; Π; `  #f
∆(x) = `
∆; Π; `  x
∆; Π; `  ei i ∈ {1, 2}
∆; Π; `  e1 ⊕ e2
∆; Π; `  ei i ∈ {1, 2}
∆; Π; `  e1 ≤ e2
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e2
∆; Π; `  letx = e1 in e2
∆; Π; `  ec ∆; Π; `  ei i ∈ {1, 2}
∆; Π; `  if ec then e1 else e2
∆[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  λx : τ. e
∆[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  µx : τ. e
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2
∆; Π; `  e1 e2
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  ?e
∆; Π; k  e1 ∆; Π; k  e2
∆; Π; `  `Bk[e1 := e2]
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  make-parameter e
∆; Π; k  e1 ∆; Π; k  e2 ∆; Π; `  e3
∆; Π; `  `Bk[parameterize e1 = e2 in kB`[e3]]
Π(r) = `
∆; Π; `  p(r)
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  flat/c(e)
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  param/c(e)
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2 ∆; Π; `  e3
∆; Π; `  e1 : τ →a (λx : τ. e2) e3
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2 ∆; Π; `  e3
∆; Π; `  e1 : τ →a (λx : τ. be2c~`) e3
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2 ∆; Π; `  e3
∆; Π; `  e1 : τ → (e2) e3
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2
∆; Π; `  egci ∆; Π; `  epci ∆; Π; `  evci ∆; Π; `  egai ∆; Π; `  epai ∆; Π; `  evai
∆; Π; `  ctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . )
∆; Π; j  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2
∆; Π; `  checkkj (e1,e2)
∆; Π; j  eg ∆; Π; j  vp ∆; Π; j  vv ∆; Π; `  ef
∆; Π; `  guardj (eg,vp,vv,ef )
∆; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c ∆; Π; k  v
∆; Π; `  `param/pkj (c, v)
∆; Π; j  va ∆; Π; j  vag1 ∆; Π; j  vav1 ∆; Π; l  vf
∆; Π; `  `ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )
∆; Π; j  vp ∆; Π; j  ev ∆; Π; `  ef
∆; Π; `  install/pj (vp,ev,ef )
∆; Π; k  x
∆; Π; `  `〈〈kx〉〉
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  |`e|
c 6= b‖jctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . )‖c
~`′
∆; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c ∆; Π; k  e
∆; Π; `  `monkj (c,e)
c ≡ b‖jctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . )‖c
~`′
∆; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c ∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  `monkj (c,e)
e1 6= ‖jc‖ ∆; Π; j  e1 ∆; Π; k  e2
∆; Π; `  `monkj (be1c~`,e2) ∆; Π; `  errorkj
∆; Π ` σ
dom(Π) = dom(σ) ∀p ∈ dom(σ),∆; Π; Π(p)  σ(p)
∆; Π  σ
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c
∆; Π; j  e ~k′ ⊆ ~k
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B b‖jflat/c(e)‖c~k′
~i = ~k ∪ ~` ∆; Π;~i;~i; j B c
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B ‖jparam/c(‖jc‖)‖
∆; Π; ~`;~k; j B c1 ∆; Π; j  e2 ∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c3
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B ‖j‖jc1‖ : τ →a (λx : τ. be2c~`) ‖jc3‖‖
∆; Π; ~`;~k; j B c1 ∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c2 ∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B ctc3
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B ‖j‖jc1‖ : τ → (‖jc2‖) ‖jc3‖‖
∆; Π; j  e1 ∆; Π; j  e2
∆; Π; `  egci ∆; Π; `  epci ∆; Π; `  evci ∆; Π; `  egai ∆; Π; `  epai ∆; Π; `  evai ~`′ ⊆ ~`
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B b‖jctx/c(e1,(egc1 ⇒ epc1 ← evc1 ), . . . ,e2,(ega1 ⇒ epa1 ← eva1 ), . . . )‖c
~`′
B.5 Metatheory of CtxPCF
Theorem 1 (Type Soundness for Surface CtxPCF). For all programs p of Surface CtxPCF such that ` p : τ
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗〈v, σ〉 or;
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗〈errorkj , σ〉 or,
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗〈p′, σ〉 and there exist p′′ such that p′ → p′′.
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 (Type Progress for CtxPCF Terms). If Σ ` p : τ , then either p is a value v, p is errorkj , or for all σ such that
∅; Σ ` σ, there exist p′ and σ′ such that 〈p, σ〉 → 〈p′, σ′〉.
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on p using Lemmas 3, 4, and 5.
Lemma 2 (Type Preservation for CtxPCF Terms). If Σ ` p : τ , ∅; Σ ` σ, and 〈p, σ〉 → 〈p′, σ′〉, then either there exists
Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ` p′ : τ and Γ; Σ′ ` σ′, or p′ = errorkj .
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on the rules of the reduction semantics using Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Lemma 3 (Unique decomposition for CtxPCF). For all well-typed programs p such that p 6= v, p 6= errorkj , and
p 6= module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,. . .; p′, there are unique e′, and E such that p = E[e′] and
e′ is one of the following:
1. v0 v1
2. µx : τ. e0
3. letx = v0 in e1
4. if v0 then e1 else e2
5. v0 ⊕ v1
6. v0 ≤ v1
7. make-parameter v0
8. parameterize v0 = v1 in e2 where v0 6= p(r)
9. parameterize p(r) = v1 in v2
10. ?v0
11. v0 := v1
12. `monkj (c0,v1)
13. checkkj (v0,e1)
14. guardj (vg,vp,vv,ef )
Proof. By induction on the size of p.
Lemma 4 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for CtxPCF). If Σ ` E[e] : τ , ∅; Π ` e : τ ′, and ∅; Π ` e′ : τ ′ then
Σ ` E[e′] : τ .
Proof. Induction on E.
Lemma 5 (Type focusing for CtxPCF). If Σ ` E[e] : τ then ∅; Σ ` e : τ ′ for some τ ′.
Proof. Induction on E.
Theorem 2 (Type Soundness for Annotated Surface CtxPCF). For all programs p of Annotated Surface CtxPCF such that
` p : τ
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈v, σ〉 or;
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈errorkj , σ〉 or,
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 and there exist p′′ such that p′ → p′′.
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 6 and 7.
Lemma 6 (Type Progress for Annotated CtxPCF Terms). If Σ ` p : τ , then either p is a value v, p is errorkj , or for all σ such
that ∅; Σ ` σ, there exist p′ and σ′ such that 〈p, σ〉 → 〈p′, σ′〉.
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on p using Lemmas 8, 9, and 10.
Lemma 7 (Type Preservation for Annotated CtxPCF Terms). If Σ ` p : τ , ∅; Σ ` σ, and 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉, then either
there exists Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ` p′ : τ and ∅; Σ′ ` σ′, or p′ = errorkj .
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on the rules of the reduction semantics using Lemma 8 and Lemma 9.
Lemma 8 (Unique decomposition for Annotated CtxPCF). For all well-typed programs p such that p 6= v, p 6= errorkj , and





[e′] and e′ is one of the following:
1. v0 v1
2. µx : τ. e0
3. letx = v0 in e1
4. if v0 then e1 else e2
5. v0 ⊕ v1
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14. guardj (vg,vp,vv,ef )
Proof. By induction on the size of p.
Lemma 9 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for Annotated CtxPCF). If Σ ` Ek[e] : τ , ∅; Π ` e : τ ′, and ∅; Π ` e′ : τ ′
then Σ ` Ek[e′] : τ .
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Lemma 10 (Type focusing for Annotated CtxPCF). If Σ ` Ek[e] : τ then ∅; Σ ` e : τ ′ for some τ ′.
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Theorem 3 (Annotation transparency). The following statements hold for Surface CtxPCF:
1. Let e be a well-typed and well-formed Annotated Surface CtxPCF program: ` p : τ and `0  p. Let p¯ be the Surface
CtxPCF expression that is like p but without annotations. If 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉, then 〈p¯,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p¯′, σ¯〉, where p¯′ is the
CtxPCF program that is like p′ but without annotations.
2. Let p¯ be a well-typed Surface CtxPCF program: ` p¯ : τ . Then there exists some Annotated Surface CtxPCF program p such
that ` p : τ and `0  p. Furthermore, if 〈p¯,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p¯′, σ¯〉, then 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 for some p′, where p¯′ is the CtxPCF
program that is like p′ but without annotations.
Proof. By a straightforward lock-step bi-simulation between the two reduction steps using the obvious annotation erasure
function to relate the corresponding configurations in each step. For the second point of the Theorem, we construct p from p¯ by
adding to each imported variable in a term of p¯ the appropriate annotation.
Definition 1 (Complete monitoring). CtxPCF is a complete monitor if any only if for all p such that ` p0 : τ and `0  p,
• 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈v, σ〉, or
• for all p1 and σ1 such that 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈p1, σ1〉 there exists p2 and σ2 such that 〈p1, σ1〉 →ann 〈p2, σ2〉, or
• 〈p0,∅〉 →ann 〈p1, σ1〉 → ∗ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉 and p1 is of the form E`[`monkj (bflat/c(p)c~`,v)] and for all such terms p1,
v = ‖kv′‖ and k ∈ ~`.
• 〈p0,∅〉 →ann 〈p1, σ1〉 → ∗ann 〈error`j , σ2〉 and p1 is of the form
E`[`monkj (bctx/c(vc,(vgc1 ⇒ vpc1 ← vvc1 ), . . . ,va,(vga1 ⇒ vpa1 ← vva1 ), . . . )c
~`
,v)]
and for all such terms p1, ` ∈ ~`.
Theorem 4. CtxPCF is a complete monitor.
Proof. As a direct consequence of Lemmas 6, 7, 11, and 12, we have that for all programs p0 such that ` p0 : τ and `0  p0,
either
• 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈v, σ〉, or
• for all p1 and σ1 such that 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈p1, σ1〉 there exists p2 and σ2 such that 〈p1, σ1〉 →ann 〈p2, σ2〉, or
• 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉.
In the last case, since `0  p0, we know that errorkj does not appear in p0. Therefore it must have been introduced by a
reduction. In particular, it must have been the result of the reduction 〈E`[checkkj (‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉 →ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉. Again,
since `0  p0, checkkj (‖j#f‖,e) must not occur in p0. Hence it must be the result of a reduction. There are three rules that
introduce checks:
1. 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ〉: In this case, we can deduce
〈p0,∅〉→ ∗ann〈E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)], σ1〉
→ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′`[checkkj (‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉
→ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉
By Lemma 12, we can deduce that for some Π such that ∅; Π  σ1, `0; Π  E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)]. By
Lemma 13, we derive ∅; Π; `  `monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖), and thus by well-formedness that k ∈ ~k.
2. 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ〉 where
c = ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . ) and
e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v))): In this case,
we can deduce
〈p0,∅〉→ ∗ann〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v)], σ1〉
→ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′`[check`j(‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉
→ann 〈error`j , σ2〉
By Lemma 12, we can deduce that for some Π such that ∅; Π  σ1, `0; Π  E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v)]. By Lemma 13, we
derive ∅; Π; `  `monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v), and thus by well-formedness that ` ∈ ~`.
3. 〈E`[(‖``ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v)], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[(checkkj ((va ()),e) v)], σ〉 where e = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf )): Again,
since `0  p0, p0 does not contain `ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf ). This it must have
been introduced by a reduction step 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,vf )], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ〉 where
c = ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . ) and
e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,vf ))). In this case,
we can deduce a longer series of reductions
〈p0,∅〉→ ∗ann〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,vf )], σ1〉
→ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′`[(‖``ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v)], σ1〉
→ann 〈E′`[(checkkj ((va ()),e) v)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′′`[check`j(‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉
→ann 〈error`j , σ2〉
By Lemma 12, we can deduce that for some Π such that ∅; Π  σ1, `0; Π  E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,vf )]. By Lemma 13, we
derive ∅; Π; `  `monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v), and thus by well-formedness that ` ∈ ~`.
Combining these three cases with the results above suffice to show that CtxPCF is a complete monitor.
Lemma 11 (Progress). For all programs p, stores σ, store typings Σ, and store labelings Π such that
• Σ ` p : τ ,
• ∅; Σ ` σ, and
• `0; Π  p,
then either
• p = v,
• p = errorkj , or
• 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉.
Proof. From Lemma 8 we know that there either p = v, p = errorkj ,
p = module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,. . .; p





[e∗]. The first two cases are immediate. If p = module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,. . .; p
′,
then either p is one of the following:
1. module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where . . . ,xv1 = v1,. . . ,xc1 = c1,. . .; p
′: Then by the reduction relation we have
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈importJ`,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),p′K, σ〉, since meta function import is total.
2. module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = e1,. . . yem = em; p
′: Then by the reduction relation
we have 〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = e1,. . . yem = em; p′, σ〉 →ann
〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = {vi/yi}e1,ye2 = e2,. . . yem = em; p′, σ〉.
In the final case, using Lemma 13 and `0; Π  p we derive ∅; Π; `∗  e∗. We proceed by case analysis on e∗:
1. v0 v1: By assumption, we have Σ ` E`∗ [v0 v1] : τ and thus by Lemma 10 that ∅; Σ ` v0 v1 : τr for some τr. By the typing
relation it must be the case that ∅; Σ ` v0 : τd → τr and ∅; Σ ` v1 : τd for some τd. Since v0 is a value with type τd → τr
and is well-formed (by further applications of Lemma 13) one of the following must be the case:
• v0 = ‖kλx : τd. e0‖ for some x, e0, and k. Similarly, v1 can be decomposed such that v1 = ‖jv′1‖ for some v′1 and j.
Since ∅; Π; `∗  ‖kλx : τd. e0‖ ‖jv′1‖, we can deduce that j = k = `∗. Thus according to the reduction relation and
Lemma 14 we have that 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [{|`
∗
v′1|/x}e0], σ〉.
• v0 = ‖k`ctx/pk′j (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖. Since
∅; Π; `∗  ‖k`ctx/pk′j (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v1, we can deduce that k = ` = `∗.
Thus according to the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have that
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [(checkk′j ((va ()),e′) v)], σ〉
where e′ = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf )).
• v0 = ‖k install/pj (vp,vv,vf )‖. Since ∅; Π; `∗  ‖k install/pj (vp,vv,vf )‖ v1, we can deduce that k = `∗. Therefore by
the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have that
〈p, σ〉 → 〈E`∗ [`∗〈jparameterize vp = vv in j〈`∗(vf v1)〉〉], σ〉.
2. µx : τ. e0: According to the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [{|`
∗
µx:τ. e0|/x}e0], σ〉.
3. letx = v0 in e1: Since ∅; Π; `∗  letx = v0 in e1, it must be the case that ∅; Π; `∗  v0, so v0 = ‖`∗v′0‖. Thus by the
reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [{|`
∗
v′0|/x}e1], σ〉.
4. if v0 then e1 else e2: Since ∅; Π; `∗  if v0 then e1 else e2, it must be the case that ∅; Π; `∗  v0, so v0 = ‖`∗v′0‖. By
assumption, we have Σ ` E`∗ [if v0 then e1 else e2] : τ and thus by Lemma 10 that ∅; Σ ` if v0 then e1 else e2 : τ ′ for
some τ ′. By the typing relation it must be the case that ∅; Σ ` v0 : Bool. Since v0 = ‖`∗v′0‖ is a value with type Bool, it
must be the case that either v0 = ‖`∗#t‖ or v0 = ‖`∗#f‖. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have either
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [e0], σ〉 or 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [e1], σ〉.
5. v0 ⊕ v1: By assumption, we have Σ ` E`∗ [v0 ⊕ v1] : τ . By Lemma 10 we have ∅; Σ ` v0 ⊕ v1 : Int and thus that
v0 = ‖kn0‖ and v1 = ‖jn1‖. Since ∅; Π; `∗  ‖kn0‖ ⊕ ‖jn1‖, we can deduce by well-formedness that k = j = `∗. Thus
according to the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have that 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [|`∗n|], σ〉 where n = n1 ⊕ n2.
6. v0 ≤ v1: Similar to the case v0 ⊕ v1.
7. make-parameter v0: Since ∅; Π; `∗  make-parameter v0, it must be the case that ∅; Π; `∗  v0 and thus v0 = ‖`∗v′0‖ for
some `∗. Then by the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [|`∗p(r)|], σ[r 7→ v′0]〉, where p is fresh.
8. `Bk[parameterize v0 = v1 in j
′
B′j [e2]] where v0 6= ‖`′p(r)‖: By assumption, we have
Σ ` E`∗ [`Bk[parameterize v0 = v1 in j′B′j [e2]]] : τ and thus by Lemma 10 that
∅; Σ ` `Bk[parameterize v0 = v1 in j′B′j [e2]] : τ ′ for some τ ′. By inversion, we can derive ∅; Σ ` v0 : τ∗ param and
∅; Σ ` v1 : τ∗ for some τ∗. Decomposing ∅; Π; `∗  `Bk[parameterize v0 = v1 in j′B′j [e2]] we have that ` = j = `∗,
j′ = k, v0 = ‖kv′0‖ and v1 = ‖kv′1‖ for some k. Further discriminating by ∅; Σ ` v0 : τ∗ param we have that either







0 ) for some k






0 ). Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have that






9. `Bk[parameterize ‖`′p(r)‖ = v1 in j∗B′j [v2]]: Inverting ∅; Π; `∗  `Bk[parameterize ‖`′p(r)‖ = v1 in j∗B′j [v2]] we
have that ` = j = `∗, j∗ = k, v1 = ‖kv′1‖, and v2 = ‖`
∗
v′2‖. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have that
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [|`∗v′2|], σ〉.
10. ?v0: By assumption, we have Σ ` E`∗ [?v0] : τ and thus by Lemma 10 that ∅; Σ ` ?v0 : τ ′ for some τ ′. By inversion, it
must be the case that ∅; Σ ` v0 : τ ′ param. This, combined with the fact that ∅; Π; `∗  ?v0 allows us to derive that either




Bk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2B`′2 [E′`∗ [?v0]]] for some k, k2, k′, `′, `′2, v′, and E′`
∗
that doesn’t contain
another parameterize expression for p(r), and when E`
∗
does not contain such a context. We consider each of these cases in
turn:




Bk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2B`′2 [E′′`∗ [?v0]]]] where E′′`
∗
contains no
parameterize for p(r): Inverting ∅; Π; `∗  ‖`∗p(r)‖ gives Π(p) = `∗. Since by assumption




Bk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2B`′2 [E′′`∗ [?v0]]]], we can again apply Lemma 13 to derive
∅; Π; `′′  `′Bk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2B`′2 [E′′`∗ [?v0]]]. By the well-formedness rule for parameterize,
`′ = `′′ and since Π(p) = `∗ it must be the case that k = k2 = k′ = `∗ `′ = `′2, and v
′ = ‖`∗v′′‖. Thus by the reduction
relation and Lemma 14 we have that






[parameterize ‖`∗p(r)‖ = |`∗v′| in `∗B`′ [E′′`∗ [|`∗v′|]]]], σ〉.




Bk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2B`′2 [E′′`∗ [?v0]]]]: By the reduction semantics
and Lemma 14, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [|`∗v|], σ〉 where v = σ(r). It must be the case that r ∈ σ since
∅; Σ ` ‖`∗p(r)‖ : τ ′ param implies Σ(r) = τ ′ and ∅; Σ ` σ.











[v0 := v1]: By assumption, we have Σ ` E`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]] : τ and thus by Lemma 10 that
∅; Σ ` `′B`′′ [v0 := v1] : Unit. By inversion, it must be the case that ∅; Σ ` v0 : τ ′ param for some τ ′. This, combined with
the fact that ∅; Π; `∗  E`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]] allows us to derive that either v0 = ‖`′′p(r)‖ for some r or
v0 = ‖`′′`′′param/pkj (c, v′0)‖. In the first case, we must consider two possibilities: when E`
∗
contains
jBk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2Bj2 [E′`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]]]] for some k, k′, j, v′, and E′`
∗
that doesn’t contain
another parameterize expression for p(r), and when E`
∗
does not contain such a context. We consider each of these cases in
turn:
(a) v0 = ‖`′′p(r)‖ and E`∗ = E′`
+
[jBk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2Bj2 [E′′`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]]]]] where E′′`
∗
contains no parameterize for p(r): Inverting ∅; Π; `′′  ‖`′′p(r)‖ gives Π(r) = `′′. Since by assumption
∅; Π; `0  E′`
+
[jBk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in B [E′′`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]]]]], we can again apply Lemma 13 to
derive ∅; Π; `+  jBk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2Bj2 [E′′`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]]]]. By the well-formedness rule for
parameterize, `′ = `∗, j = j2 = `+ and since Π(r) = `′′ it must be the case that k = k2 = k′ = `′′ and v′ = ‖`′′v′′‖.
Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have that






[parameterize ‖`′′p(r)‖ = ‖`′′v′′‖ in `′′B`∗ [E′′`∗ [|`∗()|]]]], σ〉.




Bk[parameterize ‖k′p(r)‖ = v′ in k2Bj2 [E′′`∗ [`′B`′′ [v0 := v1]]]]]: By further
applications of well-formedness, we can derive that v1 = ‖`′′v′1‖ for some v′1 and `′ = `∗. Thus by the reduction
semantics and Lemma 14, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [|`∗()|], σ[r 7→ v′1]〉.




[v0 := v1] we derive `′ = `∗. Thus by the reduction relation
and Lemma 14 we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [`∗〈`′′v′0 := kmon`
′′
j (c,v1)〉], σ〉.
12. `monkj (c0,v1): Deconstructing c0 we consider seven cases (for simplicity, we reduce |`
′
. . . |`′′c| . . .| to ‖`′c‖ since
well-formedness will ensure it):
(a) ‖`′flat/c(v0)‖: This case is a contradiction, since ∅; Π; `∗  `monkj (‖`
′
flat/c(v0)‖,v1) requires
∅; Π; j; {k}; {`}B ‖`′flat/c(v0)‖, which does not hold.
(b) ‖`′param/c(c′0)‖: Since ∅; Π; `∗  `monkj (‖`
′
param/c(c′0)‖,v1) we can deduce ` = `∗ and `′ = j. Thus by the
reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [`∗param/pkj (c′0, v1)], σ〉.
(c) ‖`′cd : τd → (cc) cr‖: Since ∅; Π; `∗  `monkj (‖`
′
cd : τd → (cc) cr‖,v1) we can deduce ` = `∗ and `′ = j. Thus by the






(d) ‖`′cd : τd →a (λx : τd. ec) cr‖: Since ∅; Π; `∗  `monkj (‖`
′
cd : τd →a (λx : τd. ec) cr‖,v1) we can deduce ` = `∗ and
`′ = j. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [λx : τd. `∗monkj ({
kmon`
∗
j (cd,v)/x}ec,`∗monkj (cr,v kmon`
∗
j (cd,x)))], σ〉.
(e) ‖`′ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖: This case is a
contradiction, since
∅; Π; `∗  `monkj (‖`
′
ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖,v1)
requires
∅; Π; j; {k}; {`}B ‖`′ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖,
which does not hold.
(f) b‖`′flat/c(v0)‖c~`: Since ∅; Π; `∗  `monkj (b‖`
′
flat/c(v0)‖c~`,v1) we can deduce ` = `∗ and `′ = j. Thus by the
reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [checkkj ((v0 v1),v1)], σ〉.
(g) b‖`′ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`: Since ∅; Π; `∗ 
`monkj (b‖`
′
ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`
,v1) we can
deduce ` = `∗ and `′ = j. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [checkkj ((vc ()),e0)], σ〉 where
e0 = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`∗ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v1))).
13. checkkj (v0,e1): By assumption, we have Σ ` E`
∗
[checkkj (v0,e1)] : τ . By Lemma 10 we have ∅; Σ ` checkkj (v0,e1) : τ ′.
By inversion, ∅; Σ ` v0 : Bool. This, combined with further decomposing ∅; Π; `∗  checkkj (v0,e1), is sufficient to derive
that either v0 = ‖j#t‖ or v0 = ‖j#f‖. In the first case and appealing to Lemma 14 we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [e1], σ〉. In the
latter, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈errorkj , σ〉.
14. guardj (vg,vp,vv,ef ): By assumption, we have Σ ` E`∗ [guardj (vg,vp,vv,ef )] : τ . By Lemma 10 we have
∅; Σ ` guardj (vg,vp,vv,ef ) : τ ′. By inversion, ∅; Σ ` vg : Bool. This, combined with further decomposing
∅; Π; `∗  guardj (vg,vp,vv,ef ), is sufficient to derive that either vg = ‖j#t‖ or vg = ‖j#f‖. Using Lemma 14, we can now
construct reductions for each case. In the first, we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [ef ], σ〉. In the latter, we have
〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈E`∗ [install/pj (vp,(vv ()),ef )], σ〉.
Lemma 12 (Preservation). For all programs p, stores σ, store typings Σ, and store labelings Π such that
• Σ ` p : τ ,
• ∅; Σ ` σ,
• `0; Π  p, and
• 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉,
there exists a store labeling Π′ such that
• Π′ ⊇ Π,
• `0; Π′  p′.
Proof. By case analysis on the reduction 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉:
1. 〈module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = e1,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉 →ann
〈module ` exports x
1
withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = {vi/yi}e1,ye2 = e2,. . . yem = em; p, σ〉: Let
Π′ = Π. It suffices to show that given
·; Π  module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where x1 = v1,. . . ,xn = vn,xe1 = e1,. . .B∆,
·; Π  module ` exports x1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = v1,. . . ,yn = vn,ye1 = {vi/yi}e1,ye2 = e2,. . . yem = em B∆. From
the premise, we have that ∅; Π; `  v1, . . ., {y1 : `, . . . , yn−1 : `}; Π; `  vn, {y1 : `, . . . , yn : `}; Π; `  e1, . . .,
{y1 : `, . . . , yn : `, ye1 : `, . . . , yem−1 : `}; Π; `  em, and Γ′ = {y1 : `, . . . , yn : `, ye1 : `, . . . , yem : `} {x1,...,xn′}. These
suffice to show the desired result, except we must also show {y1 : `, . . . , yn : `}; Π; `  {vi/yi}e1 by applying Lemma 15.
2. 〈module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where . . . ,xv1 = v1,. . . ,xc1 = c1,. . .; p′, σ〉 →ann
〈importJ`,(x1, . . . , xn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),p′K, σ〉: By Lemma 20 since from the premise we have
∆; Π  m1 B∆1, ∅; Π  mn B∆n,. . ., ∅; Π  mn B∆n, ∆n; Π; `0  e, where p′ = m1; . . . ;mn;e and
∆ = {x1 : `, . . . , xm : `} and also ∆; Π; `  v1, . . ., and ∆; Π; `  c1, . . ..
3. 〈E`[‖`λx : τ. e‖ ‖`v‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[{|`v|/x}e], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  {|`v|/x}e. By
Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e and ∅; Π; `  v, so by Lemma 15 ∅; Π; `  {|`v|/x}e.
4. 〈E`[µx : τ. e], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[{|`µx:τ. e|/x}e], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  {|`µx:τ. e|/x}e. By
Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e and ∅; Π; `  µx : τ. e, so by Lemma 15
∅; Π; `  {|`µx:τ. e|/x}e.
5. 〈E`[letx = ‖`v‖ in e], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[{|`v|/x}e], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  {|`v|/x}e. By
Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e and ∅; Π; `  v, so by Lemma 15 ∅; Π; `  {|`v|/x}e.
6. 〈E`[if ‖`#t‖ then e1 else e2], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[e1], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  e1, which holds
by Lemma 14 and well-formedness.
7. 〈E`[if ‖`#f‖ then e1 else e2], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[e2], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  e2, which holds
by Lemma 14 and well-formedness.
8. 〈E`[‖`v1‖ ⊕ ‖`v2‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v|], σ〉 where v = v1 ⊕ v2 : By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  |`v|.
By the type system, v1, v2, and v must be integers, so ∅; Π; `  |`v| holds directly.
9. 〈E`[‖`v1‖ ≤ ‖`v2‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v|], σ〉 where v = v1 ≤ v2: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  ‖`v‖. v is either #t or #f, so ∅; Π; `  ‖`v‖ holds directly.
10. 〈E`[make-parameter ‖`v‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`p(r)|], σ[r 7→ v]〉 where r is fresh: Let Π′ = Π[r 7→ `]. We must show
that `0; Π′  E`[|`p(r)|]. Since by Lemma 16, `0; Π′  E`[make-parameter ‖`v‖], by Lemma 14 it suffices to show that
∅; Π′; `  ‖`|`p(r)|‖, which holds by inspection.
11. 〈E`[?‖`p(r)‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v|], σ〉 where σ(r) = v and E does not contain parameterize `′Bk[p(r)] = v′ in E′:
By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  |`v|. By Lemma 13, we have that ∅; Π; `  ?‖`p(r)‖, so by inversion we
can derive Π(r) = ` and ∅; Π  σ. Combining these facts, we can derive ∅; Π; `  v, which is sufficient to show
∅; Π; `  |`v|.
12. 〈E`[`Bk[parameterize ‖kp(r)‖ = ‖kv‖ in kB`[E′k[?‖kp(r)‖]]]], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[`Bk[parameterize |kp(r)| = |kv| in kB`[E′k[|kv|]]]], σ〉 where E′`′ does not contain
`∗B′′k
∗
[parameterize ‖k∗p(r)‖ = v′ in k∗B`∗2 [E′′`′′ ]]: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `Bk[parameterize |kp(r)| = |kv| in kB`[E′k[|kv|]]]. This can be shown by applying the well-formedness of
parameterize using lemma 14 to demonstrate that ∅; Π; `  E′k[|kv|] by showing that ∅; Π; `  |kv|. By Lemma 13, we
have that ∅; Π; k  ?‖kp(r)‖, so by inversion we can derive Π(r) = k and ∅; Π  σ. Combining these facts, we can derive
∅; Π; k  v, which is sufficient to show ∅; Π; k  |kv|.
13. 〈E`[`Bk[‖kp(r)‖ := ‖kv‖]], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`()|], σ[r 7→ v]〉 where E` does not contain
`∗B′k
∗
[parameterize ‖k∗p(r)‖ = v′ in k∗B`∗ [E′`′ ]]: Let Π′ = Π. Then it suffices to show that Π(r) = k, ∅; Π; k  v, and
(by Lemma 14, ∅; Π; `  |`()|. The last holds by inspection. Π(r) = k and ∅; Π; k  v hold by Lemma 13 and
well-formedness or parameter assignment.
14. 〈E`[`Bk[parameterize ‖kp(r)‖ = ‖kv‖ in kB`[E′`′ [`′B′k[‖kp(r)‖ := ‖kv′‖]]]]], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[`Bk[parameterize |kp(r)| = |kv′| in kB`[E′`′ [|`′()|]]]], σ〉 where E′`′ does not contain
`∗B′′k
∗
[parameterize ‖k∗p(r)‖ = v′′ in k∗2B`∗2 [E′′`′′ ]]: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `Bk[parameterize |kp(r)| = |kv′| in kB`[E′`′ [|`′()|]]]. This holds by well-formedness of parameterize, coupled
with an application of Lemma 14 to show that ∅; Π; `  E′`[|`′()|] since ∅; Π; `′  |`′()|.
15. 〈E`[`Bk[parameterize ‖kp(r)‖ = ‖kv‖ in kB′`[v′]]], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`v′|], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  |`v′|, which follows from Lemma 13 and well-formedness.
16. 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  checkkj ((vc v),v). In turn, we must show that ∅; Π; j  (vc v) and ∅; Π; `  v. By Lemma 10 we can deduce
that ∅; Σ ` `monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖) : β for some β, and thus that ∅; Σ ` v : β. Thus v is either (), #t, #f, or an
integer, and so ∅; Π; `∗  v for all `∗. Finally, ∅; Π; j  (vc v) since ∅; Π; j  v and ∅; Π; j  vc by well-formedness of
contracts for flat/c.
17. 〈E`[`monkj (‖jparam/c(c)‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`param/pkj (c, v)], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `param/pkj (c, v), which requires that ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c and ∅; ∆; k  v. By Lemma 13 we have that
∅; Π; `  `monkj (‖jparam/c(c)‖,v). Thus by inversion we have ∅; Π; k  v and ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B param/c(c). Inverting
the latter a second time, we have that ∅; Π; {k, `}; {k, `}; j B c, which by Lemma 17 implies ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c.
18. 〈E`[`monkj (‖jcd : τ → (cc) cr‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`monkj (cc,λ x : τd. `monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,x)))], σ〉: By
Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  `monkj (cc,λ x : τd. `monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,x))). We first must establish that
cc = ‖jb‖jctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`‖ since by
Lemma 10 and repeated inversions we can show that ∅; Σ ` cc : ctx ctc. Thus by well-formedness for monitors for context
contracts, we reduce what needs to be shown to ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c′d and ∅; Π; `  λx : τd. `monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,x)).
The first follows from the fact that ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B cd : τ → (cc) cr. For the second, we must show that
∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  `monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,x)). For this, we must show that ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; {k}; {`}; j B cr and (since by
Lemma 10 and repeated inversions we can show that ∅; Σ ` cr : τr ctc for some τr) ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; k  (v kmon`j(cd,x)).
This in turn requires showing that ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  v, ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  x, and ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; {`}; {k}; j B cd (since again
by Lemma 10 and repeated inversions we can show that ∅; Σ ` cd : τd ctc for some τd). ∅[x 7→ `]; Π; `  x holds trivially.
For the remainder, we apply Lemmas 18 and 19 to the facts ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B cr, ∅; Π; `  v, and
∅[x 7→ `]; Π; {`}; {k}; j B cd, which can be obtained by Lemma 13 applied to the premise followed by repeated inversions.
19. 〈E`[`monkj (‖jcd : τ →a (λx : τ. ec) cr‖,v)], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[λ y : τd. `monkj ({
kmon`j(cd,y)/x}ec,`monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,y)))], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  λ y : τd. `monkj ({
kmon`j(cd,y)/x}ec,`monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,y))). This follows from
∅[y 7→ `]; Π; `  `monkj ({
kmon`j(cd,y)/x}ec,`monkj (cr,v kmon`j(cd,y))). The proof of this fact mirrors the proof in case
(18), except that we must also appeal to Lemma 15 to verify the well-formedness of {`monkj (cd,y)/x}ec.
20. 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`
,v)], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc ()),e)], σ〉 where
e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v))): By
Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  checkkj ((vc ()),e). To do so, we apply Lemma 13 and repeated inversions to
deduce ∅; Π; j  vc, ∅; Π; j  va, ∅; Π; j  vcgi , ∅; Π; j  vcpi , ∅; Π; j  vcvi , ∅; Π; j  vagi , ∅; Π; j  vapi ,
∅; Π; j  vavi , and ∅; Π; `  v and use these facts to demonstrate the necessary well-formedness property.
21. 〈E`[(‖``ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v)], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[(checkkj ((va ()),e) v)], σ〉 where e = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf )): By
Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  (checkkj ((va ()),e) v). In turn, we must show ∅; Π; `  checkkj ((va ()),e)
and ∅; Π; `  v. The latter holds by Lemma 13 and well-formedness. The former requires further showing that ∅; Π; j  va,
∅; Π; j  (), and ∅; Π; `  e. This is straightforward, since we can derive ∅; Π; j  va, ∅; Π; j  vagi , ∅; Π; j  vapi ,
∅; Π; j  vavi , and ∅; Π; `  vf by Lemma 13 and repeated applications of well-formedness.
22. 〈E`[guardj (‖k#f‖,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[ef ], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  ef . This holds
since by Lemma 13 and inversion ∅; Π; `  guardj (‖k#f‖,vp,vv,ef ), which requires that ∅; Π; `  ef .
23. 〈E`[guardj (‖k#t‖,vp,vv,ef )], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[install/pj (vp,(vv ()),ef )], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  install/pj (vp,(vv ()),ef ). By well-formedness, we must show that ∅; Π; j  vp, ∅; Π; j  (vv ()), ∅; Π; `  ef .
By Lemma 13 and inversion we have ∅; Π; `  guardj (‖k#t‖,vp,vv,ef ), which inverting again is sufficient to show the
required well-formedness properties.
24. 〈E`[(‖`install/pj (vp,vv,vf )‖ v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`〈jparameterize vp = vv in j〈`(vf v)〉〉], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it
suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  `〈jparameterize vp = vv in j〈`(vf v)〉〉. By the well-formedness rule for parameterize, we
must show that ∅; Π; j  vp, ∅; Π; j  vv , and ∅; Π; `  (vf v). By Lemma 13 and inversion we can derive
∅; Π; `  install/pj (vp,vv,vf ) and ∅; Π; `  v. Inverting the former, we can further infer ∅; Π; j  vp, ∅; Π; j  vv , and
∅; Π; `  vf . All that remains to be show is ∅; Π; `  (vf v), which follows through a single application of the
well-formedness rule for application.
25. 〈E`[?‖``param/pkj (c, vp)‖], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`monkj (c,?vp)], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `monkj (c,?vp). By Lemma 10, we can derive ∅; Σ ` ?‖``param/pkj (c, vp)‖ : τ ′ for some τ ′, and by further
inversion that ∅; Σ ` c : τ ′′ ctc for some τ ′′. Thus
c 6= b‖jctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`, and so by the
well-formedness rule for monitors we must show that ∅; Π; {k}; {`}; j B c and ∅; Π; k  ?vp. By Lemma 13 and inversion,
we can derive ∅; Π; `  ?‖``param/pkj (c, vp)‖ and thus by inversion the required facts.
26. 〈E`[`B`′ [parameterize ‖`′`′param/pkj (c, vp)‖ = v in `
′
B′`[e]]], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[`〈kparameterize vp = kmon`′j (c,v) in k〈`e〉〉], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `〈kparameterize vp = kmon`′j (c,v) in k〈`e〉〉, which by the well-formedness of parameterize simply requires
that ∅; Π; k  vp, ∅; Π; `  e, and ∅; Π; k  kmon`
′
j (c,v). The first two facts can be established by inverting
∅; Π; `  `B`′ [parameterize ‖`′`′param/pkj (c, vp)‖ = v in `
′
B′`[e]], which can be shown using Lemma 13. For the third,
we first must establish that
c 6= b‖jctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . )‖c
~`, since by Lemma 10
and repeated inversions we can show that ∅; Σ ` c : τ ′ ctc for some τ ′. Then by the remaining rule for monitor
well-formedness, we simply must show that ∅; Π; {k}; {`′}; j B c and ∅; Π; `′  v. Both facts follow from inverting
∅; Π; `  `B`′ [parameterize ‖`′`′param/pkj (c, vp)‖ = v in `
′
B′`[e]] as before.
27. 〈E`[`B`′ [`′param/pkj (c, vp) := v]], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`〈kvp := kmon`
′
j (c,v)〉], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `〈kvp := kmon`′j (c,v)〉. By the well-formedness rule for parameter assignment, we must show that ∅; Π; k  vp
and ∅; Π; k  kmon`′j (c,v). As in the above cases, we use type focusing and inversion to demonstrate that c is not a context
contract, and then Lemma 13 and repeated inversions to demonstrate the necessary well-formedness judgments.
28. 〈E`[checkkj (‖j#t‖,e)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[e], σ〉: By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  e. This follows from the
fact that, by Lemma 13, ∅; Π; `  checkkj (‖j#t‖,e).
29. 〈E`[checkkj (‖j#f‖,e)], σ〉 →ann 〈errorkj , σ〉: Trivial.
Lemma 13 (Label focusing for Annotated CtxPCF). If `; Π  Ek[e] then ∅; Π; k  e.
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Lemma 14 (Well-formed evaluation context plugs for Annotated CtxPCF). If `; Π  Ek[e] and ∅; Π; k  e′ then
`; Π  Ek[e′].
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Lemma 15 (Well-formed substitution for Annotated CtxPCF). If ∆[x 7→ `]; Π; k  e1 and ∆; Π; `  e2 then
∆; Π; k  {|`e2|/x}e1.
Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.
Lemma 16 (Weakening for Well-formedness for Annotated CtxPCF). If ∆; Π; `  e1 and r 6∈ e1, then ∆; Π[r 7→ k]; `  e1.
Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.
Lemma 17 (Weakening well-formed contracts for Annotated CtxPCF). If ∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c, then ∆; Π; ~k′; ~`′; j B c for all ~k′
and ~`′ such that ~k ⊆ ~k′ and ~`⊆ ~`′.
Proof. Induction on well-formed contracts.
Lemma 18 (Weakening label environments for well-formedness for Annotated CtxPCF). If ∆; Π; `  e, then
∆[x 7→ `′]; Π; `  e for any x and `′ such that x is not in the free variables of e.
Proof. Mutual induction on well-formed contracts and well-formed expressions.
Lemma 19 (Weakening label environments for well-formed contracts for Annotated CtxPCF). If ∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c, then
∆[x 7→ `′]; Π;~k; ~`; j B c for any x and `′ such that x is not in the free variables of c.
Proof. Mutual induction on well-formed contracts and well-formed expressions.
Lemma 20 (Well-formed imports for Annotated CtxPCF). If for ∆ = {x1 : `, . . . , xm : `}:
∆; Π  m1 B∆1,
. . .,
∆n−1; Π  mn B∆n, and
∆n; Π; `0  e, and also
∆; Π; `  v1, . . ., ∆; Π; `  vm and ∆; Π; `  c1, . . ., ∆; Π; `  vm, then
`0; Π  importJ`,(x1, . . . , xm),(v1, . . . , vm),(c1, . . . , cm),m1; . . . ;mn;eK.
Proof. Induction on the size of m1; . . . ;mn;e.
B.6 Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF
B.6.1 Surface Programs
Note. The following extend the syntax of Surface CtxPCF.
e ::= . . . | make-tag : (τ → τ) | reset e in e | shift e as x in e | tag/c(e, e, e)
c ::= . . . | tag/c(c, c, c)
τ ::= . . . | (τ → τ) tag
B.7 Well-typed Surface Programs
Note. The following extend the typing rules of Surface CtxPCF.
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` make-tag : (τd → τr) : (τd → τr) tag
Γ ` et : (τd → τr) tag Γ ` ev : τr
Γ ` reset et in ev : τr
Γ ` et : (τd → τr) tag Γ[x 7→ (τd → τr)] ` ev : τr
Γ ` shift et as x in ev : τd
Γ ` e1 : (τd → τr) ctc Γ ` e2 : τd ctc Γ ` e3 : τr ctc
Γ ` tag/c(e1, e2, e3) : ((τd → τr) tag) ctc
B.8 Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF
Note. The following extend the syntax and typing rules of Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF unless stated otherwise.
B.8.1 Annotated Surface Programs
e ::= . . . | `〈〈`x〉〉
B.8.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated Surface Programs
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` x : τ
Γ ` `〈〈kx〉〉 : τ
B.8.3 Well-formed Annotated Surface Programs
Note. The following extend the well-formedness rules of Annotated Surface CtxPCF.
∆; `  e
∆; `  make-tag : (τd → τr)
∆; `  et ∆; `  ev
∆; `  reset et in ev
∆; `  et ∆[x 7→ `]; `  ev
∆; `  shift et as x in ev
∆; `  ei
∆; `  tag/c(e1, e2, e3)
B.9 Ctrl+CtxPCF
B.9.1 Programs
Note. The following extend the syntax of CtxPCF.
e ::= . . . | make-tag : (τ → τ) | reset e in e | shift e as x in e | tag/c(e, e, e)
v ::= . . . | t(t) : (τ → τ) | `tag/pkj (c,c,c,v)
c ::= . . . | tag/c(c, c, c)
τ ::= . . . | (τ → τ) tag
B.9.2 Well-typed Programs
Note. The following extend the typing rules of CtxPCF.
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` make-tag : (τd → τr) : (τd → τr) tag
Γ; Σ ` et : (τd → τr) tag Γ; Σ ` ev : τr
Γ; Σ ` reset et in ev : τr
Γ; Σ ` et : (τd → τr) tag Γ[x 7→ (τd → τr)]; Σ ` ev : τr
Γ; Σ ` shift et as x in ev : τd
∆; `  (τd → τr) tag
Γ; Σ ` c1 : (τd → τr) ctc Γ; Σ ` c2 : τd ctc Γ; Σ ` c3 : τr ctc Γ; Σ ` v : (τd → τr) tag
Γ; Σ ` `tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,v) : (τd → τr) tag
Γ; Σ ` e1 : (τd → τr) ctc Γ; Σ ` e2 : τd ctc Γ; Σ ` e3 : τr ctc
Γ; Σ ` tag/c(e1, e2, e3) : ((τd → τr) tag) ctc
Γ; Σ ` σ
dom(Σ) = dom(σ) ∀r ∈ dom(σ).Γ; Σ ` Σ(r) : σ(r) ∀t ∈ dom(σ).Γ; Σ ` Σ(t) : Unit
Γ; Σ ` σ
B.9.3 Evaluation Contexts
Note. The following extend the evaluation contexts of CtxPCF.
E ::= . . . | reset E in e | reset v in E | shift E as x in e
| tag/c(E, e, e) | tag/c(c, E, e) | tag/c(c, c, E)




Note. The following extend the reduction rules of CtxPCF.
〈E[make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)], σ〉 → 〈E[t(t) : (τ1 → τ2)], σ[t 7→ ()]〉 where t is fresh in σ
〈E[reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in v], σ〉 → 〈E[v], σ〉
〈E[reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′[shift `′T ′k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)] as x in e]], σ〉
→ 〈E[reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in {v′/x}e′], σ〉
where vk = λ y : τd. reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′[ey]
and v′ = wrap+1 J`′T ′k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−1 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],vkKK
and ey = wrap+2 J`′T ′k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−2 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],yKK
and e′ = wrap+3 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−3 J`′T ′k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eKK




[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′′
〈E[`monkj (tag/c(c1, c2, c3),v)], σ〉 → 〈E[`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,v)], σ〉
wrap+1 Jt(t) : (τd → τr),eK = e
wrap+1 J`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]),eK = `monkj (c1,wrap+1 J`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eK)
wrap−1 Jt(t) : (τd → τr),eK = e
wrap−1 J`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]),eK = kmon`j(c1,wrap−1 J`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eK)
wrap+2 Jt(t) : (τd → τr),eK = e
wrap+2 J`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]),eK = `monkj (c2,wrap+2 J`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eK)
wrap−2 Jt(t) : (τd → τr),eK = e
wrap−2 J`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]),eK = kmon`j(c2,wrap−2 J`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eK)
wrap+3 Jt(t) : (τd → τr),eK = e
wrap+3 J`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]),eK = `monkj (c3,wrap+3 J`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eK)
wrap−3 Jt(t) : (τd → τr),eK = e
wrap−3 J`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]),eK = kmon`j(c3,wrap−3 J`′T k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)],eK)
B.10 Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF
Note. The following extend the syntax and typing rules of Ctrl+CtxPCF unless stated otherwise.
B.10.1 Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs
e ::= . . . | `〈〈`x〉〉 | |`e| | `〈`e〉 | bec~`
v ::= . . . | |`v| | `〈`v〉
c ::= . . . | |`c| | b|`. . . |`flat/c(v)| . . .|c~` | b|`. . . |`ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )| . . .|c~`
B.10.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` x : τ
Γ; Σ ` `〈〈kx〉〉 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` |`e| : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` `〈ke〉 : τ
Γ; Σ ` e : τ
Γ; Σ ` bec~` : τ
B.10.3 Annotated Evaluation Contexts
Note. The following extend the evaluation contexts of Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF.
F ::= . . . | reset F in e | reset v in F | shift F as x in e
| tag/c(F, e, e) | tag/c(c, F, e) | tag/c(c, c, F )
F ` ::= . . . | reset F ` in e | reset v in | shift F ` as x in e
| tag/c(F `, e, e) | tag/c(c, F `, e) | tag/c(c, c, F `)
`T k ::= [·] | `tag/p`′j (c1,c2,c3,‖`
′`′T k
′‖)
B.10.4 Annotated Reduction Semantics
Note. The following extend the reduction rules of Annotated CtxPCF.
〈E`[make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`t(t) : (τ1 → τ2)|], σ[t 7→ ()]〉 where t is fresh σ
〈E`[reset ‖``T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in v], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[v], σ〉
〈E`[reset ‖``T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`
′
[shift ‖`′`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e]], σ〉
→ann 〈E`[reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in {v′/x}e′], σ〉
where vk = |`λ y : τd. reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′`
′
[ey]|
and v′ = |`′wrap+1 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−1 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],vkKK|
and ey = |`′wrap+2 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−2 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],yKK|
and e′ = |`wrap+3 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−3 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],eKK|
and E′`
′
does not contain reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′′`′′′′
〈E`[`monkj (‖j tag/c(c1, c2)c3‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3)v], σ〉
Note. The following metafunction replaces that of Annotated CtxPCF.
oblJ‖`flat/c(v)‖,~k,~`,jK = b‖`flat/c(v)‖c~k
oblJ‖`param/c(c)‖,~k,~`,jK = ‖`param/c(oblJc,~k~`,~k~`,jK)‖
oblJ‖`cd : τ → (cc) cr‖,~k,~`,jK = ‖`oblJcd,~`,~k,jK : τ → (oblJcc,~k,~`,jK) oblJcr,~k,~`,jK‖
oblJ‖`cd : τ →a (λx : τ. e) cr‖,~k,~`,jK = ‖`oblJcd,~`j,~k,jK : τ →a (λx : τ. bec~`) oblJcr,~k,~`,jK‖
oblJ‖`ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )‖,~k,~`,jK = b‖`ctx/c(v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . ,v,(v ⇒ v ← v) . . . )‖c~`
oblJ‖`tag/c(c1, c2, c3)‖,~k,~`,jK = ‖`tag/c(oblJc1,~k~`,~k~`,jK, oblJc2,~k~`,~k~`,jK, oblJc3,~k~`,~k~`,jK)‖
B.10.5 Well-formed Annotated Programs
Note. The following extend the well-formedness rules of Annotated CtxPCF.
∆; Π; `  e
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆; Π; `  e2
∆; Π; `  reset e1 in e2
∆; Π; `  e1 ∆[x 7→ `]; Π; `  e2
∆; Π; `  shift e1 as x in e2
∆; Π; `  ei
∆; Π; `  tag/c(e1, e2, e3)
∆; Π;~k~`;~k~`; j B ci ∆; Π; k  v
∆; Π; `  `tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3,v)
∆; Π ` σ
dom(Π) = dom(σ) ∀r ∈ dom(σ),∆; Π; Π(r)  σ(r) ∀t ∈ dom(σ),∆; Π; Π(t)  σ(t)
∆; Π  σ
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c
∆; Π;~k~`;~k~`; j B ci
∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B ‖j tag/c(‖jc1‖, ‖jc2‖, ‖jc3‖)‖
B.11 Metatheory of Ctrl+CtxPCF
Theorem 5 (Type Soundness for Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF). For all programs p of Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF such that ` p : τ
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗〈v, σ〉 or;
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗〈errorkj , σ〉 or;





[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′ or;
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗〈p′, σ〉 and there exist p′′ such that p′ → p′′.
Proof. Direct consequence of Theorems 21 and 22.





[t(t) : (τd → τr)] as x in e] where E does not contain reset `′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′, or for all σ such
that ∅; Σ ` σ, there exist p′ and σ′ such that 〈p, σ〉 → 〈p′, σ′〉.
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on p using Lemmas 23, 24, and 25.
Lemma 22 (Type Preservation for Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs). If Σ ` p : τ , ∅; Σ ` σ, and 〈p, σ〉 → 〈p′, σ′〉, then either there
exists Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ` p′ : τ and Γ; Σ′ ` σ′, or p′ = errorkj .
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on the rules of the reduction semantics using Lemma 23 and Lemma 24.
Lemma 23 (Unique decomposition for Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs). For all well-typed programs p such that p 6= v, p 6= errorkj ,
and p 6= module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,. . .; p′, there are unique e′, and E such that p = E[e′]
and e′ is one of the following:
1. one of the corresponding cases of the statement of Lemma 3
2. make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)
3. reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in v










[t(t) : (τd → τr)] as x in e where E does not contain reset `′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′
6. `monkj (tag/c(c1, c2, c3),v)
Proof. By induction on the size of p.
Lemma 24 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for Ctrl+CtxPCF). If Σ ` E[e] : τ , ∅; Π ` e : τ ′, and ∅; Π ` e′ : τ ′ then
Σ ` E[e′] : τ .
Proof. Induction on E.
Lemma 25 (Type focusing for Ctrl+CtxPCF). If Σ ` E[e] : τ then ∅; Σ ` e : τ ′ for some τ ′.
Proof. Induction on E.
Theorem 6 (Type Soundness for Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF). For all programs p of Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF
such that ` p : τ
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈v, σ〉 or;
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈errorkj , σ〉 or,
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 and p′ = E`[shift ‖`
†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where E` does not contain
reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`′′′′ or;
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 and there exist p′′ such that p′ → p′′.
Proof. Direct consequence of Theorems 26 and 27.
Lemma 26 (Type Progress for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Terms). If Σ ` p : τ , then either p is a value v, p is errorkj , p is
El[shift ‖`†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where El does not contain reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`′′′′ , or for
all σ such that ∅; Σ ` σ, there exist p′ and σ′ such that 〈p, σ〉 → 〈p′, σ′〉.
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on p using Lemmas 28, 29, and 30.
Lemma 27 (Type Preservation for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Terms). If Σ ` p : τ , ∅; Σ ` σ, and 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉, then
either there exists Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that Σ′ ` p′ : τ and ∅; Σ′ ` σ′, or p′ = errorkj .
Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on the rules of the reduction semantics using Lemma 28 and Lemma 29.
Lemma 28 (Unique decomposition for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). For all well-typed programs p such that p 6= v, p 6= errorkj ,





[e′] and e′ is one of the following:
1. one of the corresponding cases of the statement of Lemma 8
2. make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)
3. reset ‖`∗`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in v
4. reset ‖`∗`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`
′
[shift ‖`†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where E′ does not contain
reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′′`′′′′




Proof. By induction on the size of p.
Lemma 29 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If Σ ` Ek[e] : τ , ∅; Π ` e : τ ′, and
∅; Π ` e′ : τ ′ then Σ ` Ek[e′] : τ .
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Lemma 30 (Type focusing for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If Σ ` Ek[e] : τ then ∅; Σ ` e : τ ′ for some τ ′.
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Theorem 7 (Annotation transparency). The following statements hold for Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF:
1. Let e be a well-typed and well-formed Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF program: ` p : τ and `0  p. Let p¯ be the Surface
Ctrl+CtxPCF expression that is like p but without annotations. If 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉, then 〈p¯,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p¯′, σ¯〉, where p¯′ is
the Ctrl+CtxPCF program that is like p′ but without annotations.
2. Let p¯ be a well-typed Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF program: ` p¯ : τ . Then there exists some Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF
program p such that ` p : τ and `0  p. Furthermore, if 〈p¯,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p¯′, σ¯〉, then 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 for some p′, where p¯′
is the Ctrl+CtxPCF program that is like p′ but without annotations.
Proof. By a straightforward lock-step bi-simulation between the two reduction steps using the obvious annotation erasure
function to relate the corresponding configurations in each step. For the second point of the theorem’s statement, we construct p
from p¯ by adding to each imported variable in a term of p¯ the appropriate annotation.
Definition 2 (Complete monitoring). Ctrl+CtxPCF is a complete monitor if any only if for all p such that ` p0 : τ and
`0; Π  p,
• 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈v, σ〉, or
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 and p′ = E`[shift ‖`
†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where E` does not contain
reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`′′′′ , or
• for all p1 and σ1 such that 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈p1, σ1〉 there exists p2 and σ2 such that 〈p1, σ1〉 →ann 〈p2, σ2〉, or
• 〈p0,∅〉 →ann 〈p1, σ1〉 → ∗ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉 and p1 is of the form E`[`monkj (bflat/c(p)c~`,v)] and for all such terms p1,
v = ‖kv′‖ and k ∈ ~`, or
• 〈p0,∅〉 →ann 〈p1, σ1〉 → ∗ann 〈error`j , σ2〉 and p1 is of the form
E`[`monkj (bctx/c(vc,(vgc1 ⇒ vpc1 ← vvc1 ), . . . ,va,(vga1 ⇒ vpa1 ← vva1 ), . . . )c
~`
,v)]
and for all such terms p1, ` ∈ ~`.
Theorem 8. Ctrl+CtxPCF is a complete monitor.
Proof. As a direct consequence of Lemmas 26, 27, 31, and 32, we have that for all programs p0 such that ` p0 : τ and `0  p0,
either
• 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈v, σ〉, or
• 〈p,∅〉→ ∗ann〈p′, σ〉 and p′ = E`[shift ‖`
†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where E` does not contain
reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`′′′′ , or
• for all p1 and σ1 such that 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈p1, σ1〉 there exists p2 and σ2 such that 〈p1, σ1〉 →ann 〈p2, σ2〉, or
• 〈p0,∅〉 → ∗ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉.
In the last case, since `0  p0, we know that errorkj does not appear in p0. Therefore it must have been introduced by a
reduction. In particular, it must have been the result of the reduction 〈E`[checkkj (‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉 →ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉. Again,
since `0  p0, checkkj (‖j#f‖,e) must not occur in p0. Hence it must be the result of a reduction. There are three rules that
introduce checks:
1. 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ〉: In this case, we can deduce
〈p0,∅〉→ ∗ann〈E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)], σ1〉
→ann 〈E`[checkkj ((vc v),v)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′`[checkkj (‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉
→ann 〈errorkj , σ2〉
By Lemma 32, we can deduce that for some Π such that ∅; Π  σ1, `0; Π  E`[`monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖)]. By
Lemma 33, we derive ∅; Π; `  `monkj (b‖jflat/c(vc)‖c~k,‖kv‖), and thus by well-formedness that k ∈ ~k.
2. 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ〉 where
c = ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . ) and
e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,v))): In this case,
we can deduce
〈p0,∅〉→ ∗ann〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v)], σ1〉
→ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′`[check`j(‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉
→ann 〈error`j , σ2〉
By Lemma 32, we can deduce that for some Π such that ∅; Π  σ1, `0; Π  E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v)]. By Lemma 33, we
derive ∅; Π; `  `monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v), and thus by well-formedness that ` ∈ ~`.
3. 〈E`[(‖``ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v)], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[(checkkj ((va ()),e) v)], σ〉 where e = guardj ((vag1 ()),vap1 ,vav1 ,. . . guardj ((vagn ()),vapn ,vavn ,vf )): Again,
since `0  p0, p0 does not contain `ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf ). This it must have
been introduced by a reduction step 〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,vf )], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ〉 where
c = ctx/c(vc,(vcg1 ⇒ vcp1 ← vcv1 ), . . . (vcgn ⇒ vcpn ← vcvn ),va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . ) and
e = guardj ((vcg1 ()),vcp1 ,vcv1 ,. . . guardj ((vcgn ()),vcpn ,vcvn ,
`ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . .,vf ))). In this case,
we can deduce a longer series of reductions
〈p0,∅〉→ ∗ann〈E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,vf )], σ1〉
→ann 〈E`[check`j((vc ()),e)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′`[(‖``ctx/pkj (va,(vag1 ⇒ vap1 ← vav1 ), . . . (vagn ⇒ vapn ← vavn ),vf )‖ v)], σ1〉
→ann 〈E′`[(checkkj ((va ()),e) v)], σ1〉
→ ∗ann〈E′′`[check`j(‖j#f‖,e)], σ2〉
→ann 〈error`j , σ2〉
By Lemma 32, we can deduce that for some Π such that ∅; Π  σ1, `0; Π  E`[`monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,vf )]. By Lemma 33, we
derive ∅; Π; `  `monkj (b‖jc‖c~`,v), and thus by well-formedness that ` ∈ ~`.
Combining these three cases with the results above suffice to show that CtxPCF is a complete monitor.
Lemma 31 (Progress). For all programs p, stores σ, store typings Σ, and store labelings Π such that
• Σ ` p : τ ,
• ∅; Σ ` σ, and
• `0; Π  p,
then either
• p = v,
• p = E`[shift ‖`†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where E` does not contain
reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`′′′′ , or
• p = errorkj , or
• 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉.
Proof. From Lemma 28 we know that there either p = v, p = errorkj , or p = E
`[shift ‖`†`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e]
where E` does not contain reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`′′′′ , or
p = module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where y1 = e1,. . . ,yn = en,. . .; p
′, or there exist e, `, and E` such that p = E`[e]. The
first three cases are immediate. If p = module ` exports xv1 withxc1 ,. . . where . . . ,xv1 = v1,. . . ,xc1 = c1,. . .; p
′, then by the
reduction relation we have 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈importJ`,(xv1 , . . . , xvn),(v1, . . . , vn),(c1, . . . , cn),p′K, σ〉, since meta function
import is total. In the final case, using Lemma 33 and `0; Π  p we derive ∅; Π; `  e. We proceed by case analysis on e (We
only show here the redexes from the reduction rules of Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF that do not overlap with those of Annotated
CtxPCF. The cases for the redexes from the rules that overlap with those of Annoted CtxPCF transfer to this proof after adjusting
the proof text to refer to lemmas for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF instead of the corresponding ones for Annotated CtxPCF):
1. make-tag : (τ1 → τ2): By the reduction relation and Lemma 34 we get
〈E`[make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`t(t) : (τ1 → τ2)|], σ[t 7→ ()]〉 where t is fresh σ.
2. reset ‖`†`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in v: Since ∅; Π; `  reset ‖`†`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in v, it must be the case that `† = `
∅; Π; `  v. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 34, we have
〈E`[reset ‖``T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in v], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[v], σ〉.
3. reset ‖`∗`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`
′
[shift ‖`†`′T ′k′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e] where E′ does not contain
reset ‖`′′′`′′T ′′k′′ [t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′′`′′′′ : With the same reasoning as in the previous case we derive that `∗ = `,
`† = `′, and k′ = k. Thus by by the reduction relation and Lemma 34 and given that metafunctions wrap+i and wrap
−
i are
total, we have 〈E`[reset ‖``T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`
′
[shift ‖`′`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e]], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in {v′/x}e′], σ〉 where vk = |`λ y : τd. reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′`
′
[ey]|
and v′ = |`′wrap+1 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−1 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],vkKK| and
ey = |`′wrap+2 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−2 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],yKK| and
e′ = |`wrap+3 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−3 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],eKK|.
4. `monkj (‖l
∗
tag/c(c1, c2)c3‖,v): With the same reasoning as in the previous case we derive that `∗ = j. Thus by the reduction
relation and Lemma 34, we have 〈E`[`monkj (‖j tag/c(c1, c2)c3‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3)v], σ〉
Lemma 32 (Preservation). For all programs p, stores σ, store typings Σ, and store labelings Π such that
• Σ ` p : τ ,
• ∅; Σ ` σ,
• `0; Π  p, and
• 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p, σ′〉,
there exists a store labeling Π′ such that
• Π′ ⊇ Π,
• `0; Π′  p.
Proof. By case analysis on the reduction 〈p, σ〉 →ann 〈p′, σ′〉 (We only show here the reduction rules of Annotated
Ctrl+CtxPCF that do not overlap with those of Annotated CtxPCF. The cases for the rules that overlap with those of Annoted
CtxPCF transfer to this proof after adjusting the proof text to refer to lemmas for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF instead of the
corresponding ones for Annotated CtxPCF):
• 〈E`[make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[|`t(t) : (τ1 → τ2)|], σ[t 7→ ()]〉 where t is fresh σ: Let Π′ = Π[t 7→ `]. We must
show that ∅; Π′; `0  E`[|`t(t) : (τ1 → τ2)|]. Since by Lemma 36, ∅; Π′; `0  E`[make-tag : (τ1 → τ2)], by Lemma 34
it suffices to show that ∅; Π′; `  El[t(t) : (τ1 → τ2)], which holds by inspection.
• 〈E`[reset ‖``T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in v], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[v], σ〉: By Lemma 34, it suffices to show that ∅; Π; `  El[v]. As
usual, by Lemma 33 and inversion of well-formedness, we obtain that ∅; Π; l  v.
• 〈E`[reset ‖``T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ in E′`
′
[shift ‖`′`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)]‖ as x in e]], σ〉 →ann
〈E`[reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in {v′/x}e′], σ〉 where vk = |`λ y : τd. reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in E′`
′
[ey]| and
v′ = |`′wrap+1 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−1 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],vkKK| and
ey = |`′wrap+2 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−2 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],yKK| and
e′ = |`wrap+3 J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−3 J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],eKK|: By Lemma 34, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in {v′/x}e′, which requires that ∅; Π; `  {v′/x}e′. As usual, by Lemma 33 and
inversion of well-formedness, we obtain that {x : `′}; Π; `′  e. This by Lemma 38 we have obtain {x : `′}; Π; `  e′.
Furthermore by Lemma 38, we obtain {y : `′}; Π; l  ey . Thus by the rules for well-formedness and Lemma 34, we obtain
∅; Π; l  vk. From this fact and Lemma 38, we obtain that ∅; Π; l′  v′. Putting all the above facts together with Lemma 35,
we derive that ∅; Π; `  reset `T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)] in {v′/x}e′.
• 〈E`[`monkj (‖j tag/c(c1, c2)c3‖,v)], σ〉 →ann 〈E`[`tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3)v], σ〉: By Lemma 34, it suffices to show that
∅; Π; `  `tag/pkj (c1,c2,c3)v, which requires that ∅; Π; k  v and ∅; Π;~k; ~`; j B ci. As usual, by Lemma 33 and inversion
of well-formedness, we obtain that ∅; Π; k  v. Also using Lemma 33, inversion of well-formedness, and Lemma 37, we
obtain ∅; Π;~k; ~`; j B ci.
Lemma 33 (Label focusing for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If `; Π  Ek[e] then ∅; Π; k  e.
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Lemma 34 (Well-formed evaluation context plugs for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If `; Π  Ek[e] and ∅; Π; k  e′ then
`; Π  Ek[e′].
Proof. Induction on Ek.
Lemma 35 (Well-formed substitution for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If ∆[x 7→ `]; Π; k  e1 and ∆; Π; `  e2 then
∆; Π; k  {|`e2|/x}e1.
Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.
Lemma 36 (Weakening for Well-formedness for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If ∆; Π; `  e and r 6∈ Π, then ∆; Π[t 7→ k]; `  e.
If ∆; Π; `  e1 and t 6∈ Π, then ∆; Π[t 7→ k]; `  exp.
Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.
Lemma 37 (Weakening well-formed contracts for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If ∆; Π;~k; ~`; j B c, then ∆; Π; ~k′; ~`′; j B c for all
~k′ and ~`′ such that ~k ⊆ ~k′ and ~`⊆ ~`′.
Proof. Induction on well-formed contracts.
Lemma 38 (Well-formed wrapping). Let i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and e such that ∆; Π; `  e. If
e′ = wrap+i J`′T ′k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],wrap−i J`T k[t(t) : (τd → τr)],eKK then ∆; Π; `′  e′
Proof. By lexicographic induction on the sizes of `
′
T ′k and `T k.
C. Example monitors
Note, in addition to the results that are described in Section 3.3, hooks may return an additional value add-lifetime specified
using #:add-lifetime. This value is a set of delegations to be added to the global delegation set along with those of the add
value. However, to control the size of the global delegation set, the library removes these delegations from the global delegation
set when the garbage collector of Racket collects the wrapped function.
(define-monitor dac
(monitor-interface make-object/c make-user/c grant/c revoke/c)
(action
[make-object/c (name setuser)
#:on-create (do-create #:closure-principal (. current-principal (dim name)))
#:on-apply (let ([owner (proj-principal closure-principal)]
[objdim (set-first (proj-dims closure-principal))])
(do-apply #:check ( @ current-principal (. closure-principal objdim use)
(. closure-principal objdim use))
#:set-principal (if setuser owner #f)))]
[make-user/c (name set-auth)
#:on-create (let ([ new-pcpl (pcpl name)])
(do-create #:add-lifetime (list ( current-principal (. new-pcpl use invoke)
@ new-pcpl))
#:closure-principal new-pcpl))
#:on-apply (do-apply #:check ( @ current-principal (. closure-principal use invoke)
closure-principal)
#:set!-principal (if set-auth closure-principal #f)
#:set-principal (if set-auth #f closure-principal))]
[grant/c (object recipient)
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (let ([ recipient-principal (recipient-principal recipient)]
[object-principal (object-principal object)])




#:on-apply (let ([ recipient-principal (. (recipient-principal recipient) use)]
[object-principal (object-principal object)])
(define (equal-recipient? p) (equal? p recipient-principal))
(define (matching-target? p) (equal? p object-principal))
(define (to-remove delegations current)
(filter (λ (d) (match d
[( labeled (actsfor (? equal-recipient? l) (? matching-target? r)) ll)
#:when (acts-for? current ll ll) #t]
[_ #f]))))
(do-apply #:remove (to-remove current-delegations current-principal)))])
(extra
(define use (dim 'use))






(. (cdr (make-user/c-authority object)) invoke)]
[( make-object/c? object)
(let* ([pcpl (cdr (make-object/c-authority object))])
(. pcpl use))]))))
Figure 11. Discretionary Access Control Monitor
(define-monitor stack-inspection
(monitor-interface make-permission permission? check-permission/c enable-permission/c
do-privileged/c context/c unprivileged/c privileged/c coerce-to-unprivileged)
(monitor-syntax-interface define/rights)








(do-apply #:add (list ( @ (. current-principal enable perm) (. current-principal static perm)
current-principal)))]
[privileged/c (perms)
#:on-create (do-create #:check ( current-principal > @ >))
#:on-apply
(let* ([ callee (pcpl (gensym 'frame))]
[static-principal (normalize (disj (list->set (map (λ (p) (. > p)) perms))))]
[scoped-delegations
(list ( @ (. callee static) static-principal >)
( @ (. callee enable) (. current-principal active) current-principal)
( @ (. callee active) (∨ (. callee enable) (. callee static)) callee))])




(do-apply #:add-scoped (list ( @ (. current-principal enable) (. current-principal static)
current-principal)))]
[context/c
#:on-create (do-create #:add-lifetime (list ( @ (← > current-delegations) > >)))
#:on-apply
(let* ([ callee (pcpl (gensym 'frame))]
[closure-pcpl (→ closure-principal closure-delegations)]
[scoped-delegations
(list ( @ (. callee static) (. closure-pcpl active) >)
( @ (. callee enable) (. current-principal active) current-principal)
( @ (. callee active) (∨ (. callee enable) (. callee static)) callee))])
(do-apply #:add-scoped scoped-delegations #:set-principal callee))]
[unprivileged/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal ⊥)])
(extra
(define active (dim 'active)) (define enable (dim 'enable)) (define static (dim 'static))
(define (use-static l r ll ds)
(if (and (not (proj? l)) (match r [(proj top _) #t] [_ #f])) (set (. l static)) (set)))
(define (make-permission name) (dim name))
(define (permission? val) (dim? val))
(define coerce-to-unprivileged
(make-contract #:name "coerce-to-unprivileged"
#:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val)
(cond [( privileged/c? val) val]
[( unprivileged/c? val) val]
[( context/c? val) val]








(lambda (stx) (syntax-case stx (set!)
[(set! binder e) (raise-syntax-error 'set! (format "cannot mutate ~a" 'define/right))]
[( define/right (head . args) (right (... ...)) ctc body (... ...))
#'( define/auth/contract (head . args) (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (... ...))))
body (... ...))]
[( define/right head (right (... ...)) ctc body)
#'( define/auth head (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (... ...)))) body)]))))))
Figure 12. Stack Inspection Monitor
(define-monitor history-based
(monitor-interface make-permission permission? check-permission/c grant/c accept/c
unprivileged/c privileged/c coerce-to-unprivileged)
(monitor-syntax-interface define/rights)
(action #:search (list use-static search-delegates-left)
[check-permission/c (perm)
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:check ( @ (. current-principal active) (. > perm) (. > perm)))]
[privileged/c (perms)
#:on-create (do-create #:check ( @ current-principal > >))
#:on-apply
(let* ([ callee (pcpl (gensym 'frame))]
[static-principal (normalize (disj (list->set (map (λ (p) (. > p)) perms))))]
[to-remove (filter (match-lambda
[( labeled (actsfor l r) ll)
#:when (and (equal? l (. current-principal enable))




[to-add (cons ( @ (. callee enable) (. current-principal active) current-principal)
(map (match-lambda
[( labeled (actsfor l r) ll)
(labeled (actsfor l (normalize (∨ r (. callee static)))) ll)])
to-remove))]
[to-scope (list ( @ (. callee static) static-principal >)
( @ (. callee active) (∨ (. callee enable) (. callee static)) callee))])




(do-apply #:add-scoped (list ( @ (. current-principal enable) (. current-principal static)
current-principal)))]
[accept-context/c
#:on-create (do-create #:add-lifetime (list ( @ (← > current-delegations) > >)))




#:on-create (do-create) #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal ⊥)])
(extra
(define active (dim 'active)) (define enable (dim 'enable)) (define static (dim 'static))
(define (use-static l r ll ds)
(if (and (not (proj? l)) (match r [(proj top _) #t] [_ #f])) (set (. l static)) (set)))
(define (make-permission name) (dim name)) (define (permission? val) (dim? val))
(define accept/c
(make-contract #:name "accept/c"
#:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val)
(make-keyword-procedure
(λ (kwds kwd-args . other-args)
(call/cc (λ (k)
(let ([cont (with-contract #:region expression accept/c #:result accept-context/c k)])
(call-with-values (λ () (keyword-apply val kwds kwd-args other-args)) cont))))))))))
(define coerce-to-unprivileged
(make-contract #:name "coerce-to-unprivileged"
#:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val)
(cond [( unprivileged/c? val) val]
[( privileged/c? val) val]







(make-set!-transformer (lambda (stx) (syntax-case stx (set!)
[(set! define/rights e) (raise-syntax-error 'set! (format "cannot mutate ~a" 'define/rights))]
[( define/rights (head . args) (right (... ...)) ctc body (... ...))
#'( define/auth/contract (head . args) (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (... ...))))
body (... ...))]
[( define/rights head (right (... ...)) ctc body)
#'( define/auth head (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (... ...)))) body)]))))))






(action #:search (list search-caps search-delegates-left)
[capability/c
#:on-create
(let* ([ child (pcpl (gensym 'capability))]
[parent current-principal]
[parenthood ( @ (. parent caps) (. child invoke) @ child)]
[endowment ( @ (. child caps) (→ (. parent caps) current-delegations) parent)]
[validity ( @ (← parent current-delegations) parent parent)])
(do-create #:add-lifetime (list parenthood endowment validity) #:closure-principal child))
#:on-apply
(let ([ introductions
(filter-map (λ (arg) (let ([ arg-cap (cdr arg)])










#:check ( @ current-principal (. closure-principal invoke) (. closure-principal invoke))
#:add-lifetime introductions #:set-principal closure-principal #:on-return return-hook))]
[unprivileged-capability/c
#:on-create
(let* ([ child (pcpl (gensym 'unprivileged))]
[parent current-principal]
[parenthood ( @ (. parent caps) (. child invoke) child)])
(do-create #:add-lifetime (list parenthood) #:closure-principal child))
#:on-apply
(let ([ introductions
(filter-map (λ (arg) (let ([ arg-cap (cdr arg)])










#:check ( @ current-principal (. closure-principal invoke) (. closure-principal invoke))
#:add-lifetime introductions #:set-principal closure-principal #:on-return return-hook))])
(extra
(define invoke (dim 'invoke)) (define caps (dim 'caps))
(define (search-caps l r ll ds) (if (pcpl? l) (set (. l caps)) (set)))
(define coerce-to-unprivileged-capability
(make-contract #:name "coerce-to-unprivileged-capability"
#:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val)
(cond [( capability/c? val) val]
[( unprivileged-capability/c? val) val]




(make-set!-transformer (λ (stx) (syntax-case stx (set!)
[(set! binder e) (raise-syntax-error 'set! (format "cannot mutate ~a" 'binder))]
[( binder head body0 body (... ...))
#`( define/contract head capability/c body0 body (... ...))]))))))
Figure 14. Object-capabilities Monitor
(define-monitor driver-monitor
(monitor-interface safe/c deprivilege/c switch-player/c check-player/c)
(action #:search (list search-delegates-left)
[safe/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal >)]
[deprivilege/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal ⊥)]
[switch-player/c (name)
#:on-create (do-create)




#:on-apply (let ([pcpl (player->pcpl name)])




(hash-ref! player-pcpls name (thunk (pcpl name))))))






(action #:search (list search-delegates-left)
[check/c (perms)
#:on-create (do-create)




#:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal (∧ current-principal perms))]
[closure/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal closure-principal)])
(extra
(define (make-permission name) (pcpl name))
(define permission? pcpl?)))




















(enable/c (∧ WriteClipboard InCopy)))]
[copy-self (check/c Safe)]
[copy-self-to (check/c GetEditorInfo)]
[cut (check/c (∧ Delete WriteClipboard))]
[dc-location-to-editor-location (check/c Safe)]
[default-style-name (check/c GetEditorInfo)]
[do-edit-operation (->a ([this any/c] [op symbol? ])
([r any/c] [t any/c])
#:auth (op)
(cond [( symbol=? op 'undo) (check/c NavigateHistory)]
[( symbol=? op 'redo) (check/c NavigateHistory)]
[( symbol=? op 'clear) (check/c Delete)]
[( symbol=? op 'cut) (check/c (∧ Delete WriteClipboard))]
[( symbol=? op 'paste)
(and/c (check/c (∧ ReadClipboard Insert))
(enable/c (∧ InPaste ReadClipboard Insert)))]
[( symbol=? op 'select-all) (check/c Select)]
[( symbol=? op 'insert-text-box)
(and/c (check/c Insert)
(enable/c (∧ InInsertBox Insert)))]
[( symbol=? op 'insert-pasteboard-box)
(and/c (check/c Insert)
(enable/c InInsertBox))]
[( symbol=? op 'insert-image)
(and/c (check/c Insert)
(enable/c (∧ InInsertBox Insert)))])
any)]
[paste (and/c (check/c (∧ ReadClipboard Insert))
(enable/c (∧ ReadClipboard Insert InPaste)))]
[move-position (->a ([this any/c] [code symbol? ])
([ extend? any/c] [kind symbol? ])
#:auth (extend?)
(cond
[(and (not (unsupplied-arg? extend?)) extend?)
(check/c (∧ Select GetEditorInfo GetText SetInsertionPoint))]
[else (check/c (∧ GetEditorInfo GetText SetInsertionPoint))])
any)]
; additional method policies
...)
Figure 17. The contract for DrRacket’s object
(define-monitor pkg-monitor






(let* ([ authors (string-split (hash-ref pkg 'author))]
[authorpcpl (disj (list->set (map author->pcpl authors)))])
(do-apply #:check ( @ current-principal authorpcpl authorpcpl)))]
[is-curator/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:check ( @ current-principal curator curator))]
[as-user/c (user)
#:on-create (do-create)




#:on-apply (do-apply #:add (list ( @ (author->pcpl user) curator curator)))]
[revoke-curator/c (user)
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:remove (list ( @ (author->pcpl user) curator curator)))]
[authority-closure/c
#:on-create (do-create #:closure-principal current-principal)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal closure-principal)]
[deprivilege/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:set!-principal unpriv)])
(extra
(define curator (pcpl 'curator))
(define unpriv (pcpl 'unprivileged))
(define pcpls (make-weak-hash))
(define (author->pcpl author)
(hash-ref! pcpls author (λ () (pcpl (string->symbol author)))))))





(->i ([ operation symbol?]
#:email [email string?]
#:password [password string?]
#:on-success [success (email) (->a () #:auth () (as-user/c email) any)]
#:on-failure [failure (-> symbol? any)])
[result any/c]))]
Figure 19. The contract for the package index authenticate function
